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This Article presents a case study in designing cooperative interstate institutions.  
It takes as its subject the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (“SSUTA”), a 
recently-developed compact among the States now awaiting congressional ratification.  
The SSUTA’s primary goal is to bring uniformity to the field of state and local sales 
taxation, a regime in which multi-jurisdictional sellers now confront literally thousands of 
different sets of rules.  I predict here that the SSUTA as currently designed is unlikely to 
accomplish that goal, and attempt to suggest possible amendments that could improve its 
expected performance.  From these efforts I extract larger lessons about the workings of 
many similar cooperative ventures.   
 My prognosis for the SSUTA turns largely on the political economy of state 
taxation.  Extending Daniel Shaviro’s seminal work on state incentives for tax-law 
disuniformity, I examine how the institutional arrangements set out by the SSUTA 
respond to the pressures identified by Shaviro.  I additionally weigh a number of factors 
omitted in his analysis.  For example, I consider the possible public-regarding tendencies 
of bureaucratic ideology or sense of mission among either state-level tax administrators, 
state courts, or the governing body of the SSUTA.  I also examine the possibility that 
ongoing intervention by Congress or a reviewing federal court might help either to check 
rent-seeking by, or instill a stronger sense of public regard in, the SSUTA Governing 
Board and state-level actors.   
 I find none of these alternatives especially promising.  For example, federal 
judicial review is often offered as a panacea by present critics of the SSUTA.  However, 
it was precisely the relative incompetence of federal judges in balancing the goods of 
uniformity against the possible autonomy and experimental benefits of diversity that lead 
the Supreme Court to, in essence, punt the problem back to Congress.  And the failure of 
local businesses to internalize the costs of national disuniformity likely distorts the 
decisions not only of state politicians and bureaucrats but also of state courts and 
Congress.  
 Having made a more precise diagnosis of the problems that confront the SSUTA, 
I am able to suggest more precisely targeted solutions.  Somewhat radically, I propose 
tying the deductibility of businesses’ federal deduction for state and local tax paid to 
federal administrative approval of the taxing state’s compliance with SSUTA, with 
approval subject in turn to federal judicial review.  In this way, the businesses are made 
to internalize the costs they impose on others.  And the most politically remote actors, 
 
* Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law.  A.B. Harvard; J.D. Columbia; LL.M. in 
Taxation, Georgetown.  I am grateful for helpful comments and suggestions from Wally Hellerstein, Ron 
Pearlman, Jim Rossi, Stefan Sciaraffa, Mark Seidenfeld, John Swain, and Lesley Wexler  -- particularly 
from Wally, who pulled no punches.  Any mistakes that remain are solely the result of my own 
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federal judges, would have a reliable interpretive partner to supplement their own, 
ordinarily rather weak, fact finding and policy analysis. 
 Finally, I claim that this analysis is generalizable.  It helps to evidence the 
weakness of nationwide policy making that is dependent purely either on unmitigated 
“market” federalism, or on relatively rigid and uninformed judicial mandates.  And it 
opens the possibility that conditional taxes, like conditional spending, can be a significant 
tool in coordinating our national policy goals.  
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Introduction 
 One of the strengths of the U.S. Constitution is that it draws up a fairly open floor 
plan for arranging the internal architecture of government.  Justice Kennedy, for example, 
has likened the invention of federalism to a sort of Manhattan Project of political 
philosophy.1 With largely autonomous sub-national governments, we get tremendous 
opportunities for experiments in the goals and design of government.2 But, of course, the 
 
1 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
2 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); David L. Shapiro, 
FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 85--88 (1995); Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism 
and Constitutional Rights, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1749--76 (2005); Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The 
Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60--69 (1998); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism,
82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 381--82, 386--405 (1997); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Limits of Power: 
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jostling of so many different political bodies also leads to serious collective action 
problems, as the Articles of Confederation experience taught us.3
Fortunately, then, the Constitution also seems to offer many different avenues for 
coordinating national and local policies.  The menu includes prescriptive federal 
legislation,4 judicially-enforced constitutional rights,5 compacts among states,6 and offers 
of federal or other grants in exchange for state agreements,7 among many others.  Each of 
these, in turn, can involve many different permutations.  An agreement might be held 
 
Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2217 (1998); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Three Faces of 
Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1575 (1994). 
3 E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 4 (John Jay); THE FEDERALIST No. 15 (Alexander Hamilton); James Madison, 
Vices of the Policial System of the U. States (April 1787), reprinted in 24 LETTERS OF THE DELEGATES TO 
CONGRESS: 1774-1789 at 265 (Paul H. Smith ed. 1996); JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 29--30 (statement of Edmund Randolph) (Adrienne Koch ed. 1984); 
PATRICK T. CONLEY AND JOHN P. KAMINSKI, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES 25--26, 58, 202 (1988); 
PETER S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, JURISDICTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1775-1787 at 8--20, 122 (1983); Richard E. Levy, Federalism and Collective Action, 45 U. KAN.
L. REV. 1241, 1256--66 (1997).  For a thorough grounding in the theory of collective action problems, see 
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF Groups (1962); 
TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (1992). 
4 For a careful theoretical description and, in part, condemnation of this approach, see Richard B. Stewart, 
Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 328--35 (1987); Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive 
Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 86, 89--102 (1986). 
5 Of course, there are many senses in which we can describe constitutional rights as a way of shaping 
national policy.  For instance, there is the communitarian sense in which the Constitution helps to define 
the limits of our political community and the meaning that attaches to membership in it.  See, e.g., Frank 
Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1503--15 (1988); Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, 
International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1392--94 (1999) 
(describing constitutional treatment of immigration as part of definition of national identity).  Then, 
perhaps one metaphysical step down, there is the sense in which constitutional rights are expressions of 
national ideals of justice, which states are not free to contradict.  See, e.g., JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW 
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 185 (1980); Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New 
Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 127--30.  And then there 
is the more pedestrian (but still important) sense in which constitutional rights serve an almost mechanical 
role in implementing good policy, as by preventing inefficient state interference with commerce, or 
remedying other kinds of collective action problems.  See Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to Replace 
Clear Statement Rules with Clear Thinking About Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV.
155, 209--10 (2004); Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 33, 49-
-59 (1985).  There may also be others.   
6 WILLIAM KEVIN VOIT, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, INTERSTATE COMPACTS & AGENCIES 10--13, 158--59 
(2003) (identifying over 200 compacts); see Ann Bowman, Horizontal Federalism: Exploring Interstate 
Interactions, 14 J. PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH & THEORY 535, 535--46 (2004); Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate 
Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem of Permanency, 49 FL. L. REV. 1, 2--7 (1997); see 
generally Felix Frankfurter & John Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution---A Study in Interstate 
Adjustments, 34 Yale L.J. 685 (1925). 
7 See Galle, Getting Spending, supra note 5, at 185--86.   
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together by the threat of private suits,8 by the judgments of a new quasi-governmental 
entity established under the agreement,9 by a third-party government arbiter,10 by public 
and stakeholder pressure in response to data disclosed about the performance of the 
parties to the agreement,11 or merely by mutual interest in its continued existence.  The 
rules for each of these enforcement functions, too, vary widely.   
 Again, the pre-constitutional era showed us clearly that the institutional design of 
our interstate arrangements can be crucial to their success or failure.  If we choose 
unwisely, we may end up with a problem worse than the one we started out to solve.   
 This Article does not attempt a grand, high-level theory of interstate institutions.  
Others have undertaken that mission, often impressively.12 My focus, instead, is much 
closer to the ground.  I want to get at how, in actual practice, we can apply the theory of 
institutional design to particular challenges in interstate coordination.  In order to do that, 
I have adopted a case-study approach.  I take a single policy challenge, and describe 
 
8 Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 667--71 (2000); Brian D. 
Galle, Can Federal Agencies Authorize Private Suits Under Section 1983? A Theoretical Approach, 69 
BROOK. L. REV. 163, 203--05 (2003) (describing role of private suits under 26 USC ' 1983 in promoting 
collaborative regulatory systems).  For those who might wonder how the States can, by their mutual 
consent, create a federal cause of action, it is worth noting that Congress, in approving a compact, can 
provide for tools for its enforcement that would not be available to the States alone.  Virginia v. West 
Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 602 (1918). 
9 E.g., New York-New Jersey Port Authority Compact, ch. 77, 42 Stat. 174 (U.S. 1921); see JOSEPH F. 
ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE COOPERATION: COMPACTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENTS (2002). 
10 See DAVID B. WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM: SLOUCHING TOWARD Washington 182, 189--91 
(1995) (discussing -- and decrying -- expansion of federal agencies in controlling relationships between 
states through federal spending programs). 
11 Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
267, 314, 321 (1998); Brandon L. Garrett & James S. Liebman, Experimentalist Equal Protection, 22 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 308--13 (2004); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: 
TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 363--70 (2001).  
12 E.g., THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2001); 
Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person / One Vote and Local Government, 60 U. CHI. L. REV.
339 (1993); Dorf & Sabel, supra note 11; Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative 
State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1997); Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Regulatory Pluralism: Designing 
Policy Mixes for  Environmental Protection, 31 POL’Y STUD. J. 1 (2003); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The 
Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 
(2004). 
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existing state and federal efforts to address it.  Then, I unpack those existing efforts and, 
using what we know about how institutions work, try to rebuild them to better realize the 
policy goal.  In the process, I uncover several significant, generalizable lessons about the 
pragmatics of institutional design.  The policy challenge I have selected is a timely one: 
the threat posed to state and local budgets by sales into their jurisdictions from far away, 
particularly in the fast-growing area of sales over the internet.13 
The rise of electronic commerce is something like the global warming of state 
finance.  That is, it is a problem of the States’ own making that is not urgent now but may 
someday not far away leave them deep underwater.  The States, of course, did not invent 
the internet.  But it is largely their own fault that the exploding market for goods and 
services sold over the internet may put them in dire financial straits.  Fortunately, they 
may have a serviceable patch already on its way, called the Streamlined Sales and Use 
Tax Agreement (“SSUTA”).14 Unfortunately, as I will try to show, in its present form it 
faces many serious challenges. 
 Why does e-commerce affect state budgets?  States depend heavily on sales and 
use tax15 revenues – some states draws upwards of 40% of their revenues from them.16 
Although e-commerce is still a relatively small portion of total nationwide retail sales, in 
 
13 For some earlier scholarly discussions of the scope of this problem, see Kendall L. Houghton & Walter 
Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Perspectives on Proposals for Change and Their 
Constitutionality, 2000 BYU L. REV. 9, 10--12, 51; Walter Hellerstein, Deconstructing the Debate Over 
State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 13 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 549 (2000); Walter Hellerstein, State and 
Local Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Reflections on the Emerging Issues, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 691 
(1998). 
14 Available at < http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/agreement.htm>. 
15 A “use” tax is simply a tax imposed on the in-state use of a good or service purchased out of state; it is 
designed to make state purchasers indifferent between purchasing in and out of state.   
16 See U.S. Census Bureau, State Government Tax Collections 2005, available at  
<http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/statetax/05staxss.xls>. 
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nominal terms the figures are already very substantial.17 And the proportion is growing 
quickly.18 As the United States transitions to a knowledge-based economy, more and 
more of what we produce that is of value to consumers will be readily ordered or 
acquired from our computer chair or our set-top cable box.19 Current estimates of the 
cost of e-commerce to the States over the next few years range from a few billion to tens 
of billions of dollars.20 If states continue to depend on sales taxes, they will have to find 
ways to tax these transactions.   
 Unfortunately, the States have made it hard on themselves in that regard.  Over 
the past few decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Dormant Commerce 
Clause to dramatically limit the authority of states and other local taxing jurisdictions to 
oblige non-local sellers to collect sales and use taxes – in essence, only sellers with a 
“physical presence” in the jurisdiction need comply with the jurisdiction’s demands.21 
That rule, arguably, arose in response to the States’ irresponsibility in allowing such a 
bewildering array of state and local sales tax rules to develop.  The Court, turn, seems to 
have felt compelled to act in order to protect the constitutional guarantee of an open 
market for domestic goods against the threat of rules so cumbersome in their multiplicity 
that interstate trade would diminish.   
 
17 For example, although e-commerce made up only about 1.7 percent of all U.S. 2003 retail sales, that 
represented $56 billion in sales.  U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, E-Stats, E-Commerce 2003 Highlights (May 11, 
2005), available at <www.census.gov/estats>. 
18 For instance, the percentage of e-commerce as a portion of all retail sales roughly tripled between 2000 
and 2005, and grew at a fairly steady rate throughout that period.  U.S. Census Bureau, Quarterly Retail E-
Commerce Sales 2nd Quarter 2005, at 1 (Aug. 19, 2005).   
19 Houghton & Hellerstein, supra note 13, at 12--13; Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income and 
Consumption in the New Economy: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 38 GA. L. REV. 1, 41-42 
(2003). 
20 See Multistate Tax Commission, Federalism at Risk, 2003 STATE TAX TODAY 217-4, at [6]; George S. 
Isaacson, A Promise Unfulfilled: How the Streamlined Sales Tax Project Failed to Meet Its Own Goals for 
Simplification of State Sales and Use Taxes, 2003 STATE TAX TODAY 207-5, at [17] (summarizing 
competing estimates).     
21 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311--15 (1992). 
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The Court’s interpretation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, however, can be 
superseded by Congress.  Thus, in the last several years the States have developed the 
SSUTA, a multi-lateral agreement among states designed to harmonize their sales tax in 
exchange for congressional authorization to impose collection obligations on out-of-state 
sellers.22 It is a tremendous and impressive undertaking.  But it has some potential flaws.  
Quite possibly, the same political and social forces that melted our fiscal ice caps will 
keep the states from genuinely reforming.  
 To be more specific, I argue that the design of the Agreement leaves itself open to 
political influence by the very stakeholders who have driven state tax disuniformity.  
Local businesses have powerful incentives, and ample oppportunity within the relatively 
weak anti-discrimination protections of the Court’s tax Commerce Clause jurisprudence, 
to shape local tax policy to favor themselves.  The Agreement, as now drawn up, sets out 
a model code for each state to enact and interpret independently, with the threat of some 
sanction if they stray too far from the collective ideal.  But the sanction mechanism 
depends on a three-quarters vote from the members of the Agreement, who are 
represented largely by political appointees from their home states, removable at the 
discretion of state political actors.  Through log-rolling and other similar devices, 
member states are very likely to escape any punishment for deviation -- and, knowing 
this, will be free to give heed to the cohesive, aggressive demands of in-state businesses.  
And state-by-state judicial review will be unlikely to constrain state heterodoxy, as 
judges will either themselves be politically dependent or, if independent, unconcerned 
with the threat of sanctions.   
 
22 For the history of the SSUTA’s development, see WALTER HELLERSTEIN & JOHN A. SWAIN,
STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAX 2-1 to 2-15 (1st ed. 2005). 
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Thus, I argue, the SSUTA can only succeed if its Governing Board is reformed in 
a way that allows it to influence apolitical state courts, and if the stakeholders who 
influence political decisions internalize the costs of state disuniformity.  These 
considerations, I show, are related.  Therefore, I suggest a possible improvement on the 
current design, proposing that the federal deductibility of a state’s corporate taxes be 
made contingent on a Treasury determination that the state is in compliance with the 
SSUTA.  The deduction helps to make certain that in-state businesses, who I claim are 
the driving forces of disuniformity, have a reason to want the SSUTA genuinely to 
succeed.  If the Board, freed of their influence, can then produce opinions that rest on 
principled application of the Agreement’s nationalizing goals rather than parochial 
advantage, it has a hope of swaying state judicial opinion to its way of thinking.  Federal 
judicial review, although problematic standing by itself, can supplement both ends if 
supported by expert federal agency judgment.   
 This analysis also gives us important clues about the larger puzzle of the design of 
interstate institutions.  Attempting to reform a system upon which the fiscal future of the 
States depends is, of course, an important goal in itself.  But I try to show here also that a 
close analysis of the SSUTA, and of potential amendments to it, also demonstrates the 
weaknesses of some traditional approaches to coordinating state and federal policy.  In 
particular, this case study, I argue, is strong evidence of the need for a “refereed 
federalism,” a vision of federalism in which the experimentation in and competition 
between thousands of local jurisdictions is managed and channeled by a system of 
officials whose incentives are themselves balanced and attuned to screen out 
imperfections in the political market.  That conclusion has important implications 
1647433.4  10
especially for judicial efforts to impose national standards in such diverse fields as state 
business tax incentives and criminal procedure. 
 Thus, Part I of this Essay offers a description of the evolution of federal limits on 
state power to tax sales originating in another jurisdiction, as well as the shape of the 
SSUTA that developed in response.  Part II begins the diagnosis of the institutional 
design problem to be overcome, by providing an overview of the political economy of 
state sales and use taxation.  Parts III and IV describe what I see as the central obstacles 
for the SSUTA’s success -- in large measure, its failures to resolve the difficulties 
uncovered in Part II.  Part V describes my solution, and how it addresses the structural 
failings uncovered earlier.  In the Conclusion, I examine our lessons learned for similar 
projects in other fields. 
I.  An Overview  
 In order to understand the SSUTA it is helpful first to explore some of the factors 
that make it necessary.  The most immediate impetus for the Streamlined Sales Tax 
Project23 was probably the Supreme Court’s decision, in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 
that the Commerce Clause prohibits a state or local taxing jurisdiction from imposing an 
obligation to collect sales or use tax on a vendor whose only “physical presence” in the 
jurisdiction is the travel of its goods by common carrier to its customers.24 Although the 
Court’s ultimate rationale is open to some question, it seems clear that at least one major 
determinant on the face of the opinion was that forcing mail-order sellers to cope with the 
different taxing rules of literally thousands of different taxing jurisdictions was 
 
23 That is, the Project that gave rise to development of the SSUTA.  See John A. Swain & Walter 
Hellerstein, The Political Economy of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 605, 
609--10 (2005). 
24 Quill, 504 U.S. at 311--15.  
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inconsistent with the Commerce Clause’s goal of creating a free, open market for 
domestic goods.25 In this part I describe the development of the Quill rule, and the design 
of the Agreement that the States developed in response  
A.  Black “Letter” Law 
At the time of Quill, the United States included somewhere on the order of 6000 
distinct sets of local tax rules.26 Even where those rules were facially similar, each 
jurisdiction could litigate the application of its terms, such as whether a particular item or 
bundle of items was “tangible personal property” or used in “manufacturing.”27 Each 
jurisdiction, in theory, could have its own forms, and the authority to audit sellers to 
ensure that they were properly collecting sales and use taxes.  Understandably, 
nationwide sellers complained -- and still complain -- that the burden of complying with 
this welter of rules could be substantial.28 
Ultimately, this proliferation of tax rules and burdens had additional, legal, 
consequences.  Through the middle of the 20th Century, the Supreme Court imposed 
fairly drastic limits on state power to tax interstate commerce, using not only the 
Commerce Clause (or its negative implications) but also the Due Process Clause.29 In a 
series of early cases, the Court held that due process limited a state’s jurisdiction to 
impose tax and the obligation to collect tax on its behalf only to entities having sufficient 
 
25 See Charles E. McClure, Jr., Sales and Use Taxes on Electronic Commerce:  Legal, Economic, 
Administrative, and Political Issues, 34 URB. LAW. 487, 497--98 (2002); Swain & Hellerstein, supra note 
23, at 605.   
26 Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6. 
27 Isaacson, supra note 20, at [13].  Isaacson represents the Direct Marketing Association, a trade group of 
remote-selling merchants.  Id. at [1]. 
28 Isaacson, supra note 20, at [3--4]; see Charles E. McClure, Jr., Radical Reform of the States’ Sales and 
Use Tax:  Achieving Simplicity, Economic Neutrality, and Fairness, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 567, 573--74 
(2000). 
29 E.g., Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756--57 (1967); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. 
O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 608--09 (1951); Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).  
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“nexus” with the taxing state.30 Generally, in order to meet this standard, the state had to 
show that the entity had some “definite link” or “minimum connection” with the state, 
which it could satisfy by demonstrating a physical presence within its borders.31 
Similarly, on the Commerce Clause side, the Court often refused to allow “direct” taxes 
on interstate commerce, although it was never entirely clear what separated direct from 
indirect.32 
By 1977, though, both ends of the doctrine had largely been transformed, setting 
the stage for a potential revolution in state taxing power.  The reach of a state court’s 
jurisdiction had expanded, so that even in suits in rem it could reach any entity with 
minimum contacts, ties, or relations to it.33 And in the commerce arena, the Court had 
rejected formalism in favor of a practical test that appeared to guard primarily against 
unfair or discriminatory tax regimes.34 It appeared, then, that there would in the future be 
few barriers to states imposing fairly apportioned and non-discriminatory taxes or tax-
collection obligations, even on those who sold largely from out of state.  Although the 
Court’s restatement of the Commerce Clause test for permissible taxes included a 
requirement of “substantial nexus,”35 it seemed plausible that that meant only the 
minimal nexus imposed by the Due Process Clause.  
The Quill case, in 1992, dashed those expectations.  Quill, as I’ve mentioned, held 
that “substantial nexus” demands some physical presence in a state before the state can 
 
30 Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344--45 (1954). 
31 Id.; see Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756.   
32 Freeman, 329 U.S. at 252.  On the uncertain doctrinal meaning of “direct” and “indirect” taxes in this 
context, see generally Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1 (1940). 
33 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977); see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
316 (1945).  The Burger King decision eight years later made this even clearer.  Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).  
34 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279, 285 (1977).  
35 Id. at 279. 
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collect, or demand help in collecting, sales or use taxes from a seller.36 Quill 
acknowledged that, under the Due Process Clause, the States were now free to impose 
such a tax.37 But it held that “substantial nexus” also embodied dormant Commerce 
Clause “concerns about the national economy.”38 In particular, it explained that the 
substantial nexus test “limit[s] the reach of state taxing authority so as to ensure that state 
taxation does not unduly burden interstate commerce.”39 And, in the threat of imposing 
compliance obligations with “6,000-plus taxing jurisdictions,” it found a serious 
likelihood that vesting jurisdiction to tax in every one of those jurisdictions would burden 
the activities of interstate vendors.40 Its solution was to preserve a pre-1977 “bright-line 
rule” setting out a sales and use tax “safe harbor for vendors ‘whose only connection with 
customers in the taxing State is by common carrier or the United States mail.’”41 
Diversity now had its price: in many cases, states would be forced to tax in-state 
businesses more heavily than out-of-state sellers.42 In addition, the Court’s resolution left 
it rather uncertain what, precisely, “substantial nexus” would require in any other 
circumstance, including any other form of tax.43 
36 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311, 315 (1992).  I describe the Quill holding carefully, 
because, as we will see momentarily, it is unclear to what extent it has any significance outside the context 
of sales and use taxes.   
37 Id. at 307.   
38 Id. at 312-13.   
39 Id. at 313. 
40 Id. at 313 & n.6.  For a summary of empirical studies of the welfare effects of growing tax regime 
disparities, see Bartley Hildreth et al., Cooperation or Competition: The Multistate Tax Commission and 
State Corporate Tax Uniformity, 38 STATE TAX NOTES 827, [836--38] (2005).  The authors conclude that 
the available evidence shows measurable but rather modest costs associated with the existing, pre-SSUTA, 
arrangements.  Id. As Daniel Shaviro notes, however, these types of estimates for the most part fail to 
include additional social costs, such as tax planning, litigation, and lobbying.  Daniel Shaviro, An Economic 
and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 895, 920 (1992).   
41 Quill, 504 U.S. at 313-14 (quoting Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Rev., 386 U.S. 753 (1967)).   
42 See McClure & Hellerstein, supra note 64, at [6]; Shaviro, supra note 86, at 286; MTC, supra note 20, at 
[6]. 
43 Houghton & Hellerstein, supra note 13, at 28; John A. Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A 
Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, 45 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1 (2003).   
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The explicit shift, however, to a pure Commerce Clause rationale had its own 
important implications.  As the Court repeatedly emphasized, Congress has the power to 
overrule its dormant Commerce Clause determinations.  Indeed, the Court all but handed 
Congress an invitation, explaining that it was overruling any earlier implication that the 
Due Process Clause might stand in Congress’ way, and concluding, “Congress is now 
free to decide whether, when, and to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-
order concerns with a duty to collect use taxes.”44 
B.  The States Respond: The SSUTA 
Thus, although Quill was technically a loss for the States, the opinion did offer 
local taxing authorities a potential path to jurisdiction over out-of-state sellers.  Over the 
ensuing decade-plus, the States developed a two-pronged strategy to realize the 
opportunity the Court had offered them.  First, the States crafted a compact, known as the 
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement, in which they sought to harmonize much of 
what had grown disparate.45 And, critically, they sought congressional authorization, 
under the Commerce Clause, to require sellers to collect their sales and use taxes.46 
The structure and history of the SSUTA are described thoroughly elsewhere,47 so 
I will mention here only a few brief highlights.  The Agreement is a voluntary compact 
among the member states.48 Membership is contingent on approval from existing 
members.49 Approval is formally granted through the principle governing entity of the 
 
44 Quill, 504 U.S. at 317-18; see id. at 320 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 333 (White, J., concurring). 
45 See Swain & Hellerstein, supra note 23, at 609--10.   
46 HELLERSTEIN & SWAIN, supra note 22, at 10-1 to 10-2. 
47 Walter Hellerstein and John Swain, in fact, already have prepared a brief treatise describing the SSUTA.  
HELLERSTEIN & SWAIN, supra note 22.   
48 Id. at 3-2 to 3-3. 
49 SSUTA ' 801. 
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Agreement, known as, logically enough, the Governing Board.50 I discuss details of the 
Board’s composition in considerable length over the next two Parts.   
Substantively, the Agreement obliges would-be member states to enact a variety 
of amendments to their own statutes or constitutions.51 Perhaps most significantly, the 
Agreement sets out a “library” of putatively uniform definitions for all of the myriad of 
items that could be subject to sales tax.52 States must then establish a tax “matrix,” in 
which they can check off which of these library items they will tax.53 The states cannot 
impose a tax on any item that would also be covered by a library definition unless it uses 
the library definition of that item.54 States can have only a select number of tax rates, 
including rates imposed by sub-state entities such as cities or counties.55 Further, the 
states must adopt uniform administrative procedures, also set out in the Agreement.56 
The Board will contract with software developers to produce easy-to-use computer 
software to incorporate all of the choices and rates set out by each state and locality, 
thereby (it is hoped) allowing any out-of-state merchant to comply easily with the tax 
rules of every jurisdiction.57 
The Agreement has no formal legal status.  That is, there is no SSUTA equivalent 
of the Supremacy Clause.  Just as with other model codes, once states have enacted their 
mirror provisions into law, those provisions simply become part of each jurisdiction’s 
 
50 Id.
51 HELLERSTEIN & SWAIN, supra note 22, at 3-3. 
52 SSUTA '' 302, 316; SSUTA App. C.  
53 HELLERSTEIN & SWAIN, supra note 22, at 7-12. 
54 Id. at 304. 
55 SSUTA ' 308.   
56 E.g., SSUTA '' 317--20, 322, 324, 401--04.  Each state also can only have one auditing authority.  Id. '
301. 
57 HELLERSTEIN & SWAIN, supra note 22, at 7-25 to 7-30. 
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statutory or constitutional scheme.58 In order to obtain membership, however, a new 
member state must show “substantial compliance” with the existing Agreement,59 and the 
Governing Board has power to sanction, by three-quarters vote, any existing member 
who goes out of “substantial compliance.”60 Again, I discuss this mechanism in more 
detail in a bit. 
Finally for now, the plan of the Agreement is that it will later be complemented 
by federal legislation.  Several such bills have been proposed over the past several terms 
of Congress, although none has yet passed.61 In the main, the federal legislation would 
largely overrule Quill, granting SSUTA member states jurisdiction to impose tax 
collection obligations on sellers regardless of their “nexus” with the taxing state.62 
Various iterations of the legislation have also added some wrinkles to the structure of the 
agreement, such as a provision for federal judicial review of Board decisions.63 
II.  The Political Economy of Tax Chaos 
In order to appraise whether the SSUTA is likely to succeed or fail in its goal of 
nationwide uniformity, we first have to understand the forces that produced 
disuniformity.  In one sense, the diversity of state and local sales tax rules is by design.  
The Constitution largely preserved state autonomy to tax, albeit often subject to 
Congressional oversight.64 There are good, and familiar, policy reasons for that decision.  
 
58 See HELLERSTEIN & SWAIN, supra note 22, at 3-2 to 3-3; Isaacson, supra note 20, at [10].   
59 SSUTA ' 801. 
60 SSUTA '' 805, 809. 
61 Streamlined Sales Tax Simplification Act, S.2153, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (2005); Streamlined Sales and 
Use Tax Act, S.1736, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003); Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Act, H.R. 3184, 108th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (2003); Internet Tax Moratorium and Equity Act, S.512, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001).   
62 See McClure & Hellerstein, supra note 64, at [10] (summarizing proposed legislation).   
63 E.g., Streamlined Sales Tax Simplification Act, S.2153 ' 5(b), 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (2005); Streamlined 
Sales and Use Tax Act, S.1736 '5(b), 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003). 
64 See Charles E. McClure & Walter Hellerstein, Congressional Intervention in State Taxation: A 
Normative Analysis of Three Proposals, 2004 STATE TAX TODAY 40-3, at [3]. 
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Different states will have different distributions of needs and resources, so that the most 
efficient tax base may vary by region.65 Tax and spending decisions often are reflections 
of an underlying notion of distributive justice.66 In a federal system in which citizens are 
fairly mobile and local government reasonably democratic, we can likely best enable 
everyone to live under a close approximation of their own ideal of justice if we allow 
sub-national units to make policy, including tax policy, based on discrete notions of 
justice.67 In that way, citizens can shop for the model that best fits their preferences.   
Even if we think norms of justice are or ought to be relatively uniform 
nationwide, tax federalism has experimental benefits.  It is worth describing these in 
some detail, because their significance is largely overlooked in Quill. In the so-called 
“Tiebout” model of inter-state competition, parallel state efforts to reach similar policy 
goals put competitive pressure on states to do the best job, so as to retain citizens and 
attract capital.68 Entrepreneurial politicians can win rewards by eliminating inefficiencies 
 
65 For example, if our goal is to maximize total utility across a community, we can produce more utility by 
taxing more heavily those whose utility curve is more inelastic relative to income and transferring those 
resources to those whose curves are more elastic.  See Richard A. Musgrave & Peggy B. Musgrave, Public 
Finance in Theory and Practice 277--95 (5th ed. 1989).  It is possible that utility curves are more consistent, 
or are more measurable, by region rather than nationally.   
66 See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and 
Economic Integration of Europe, 115 Yale L.J. 1186, 1231 (2006).  
67 See Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 444--47 (2002); 
Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:  Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1497-98 
(1987). 
68 ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INTERJURISDICTIONAL TAX AND POLICY 
COMPETITION: GOOD OR BAD FOR THE FEDERAL SYSTEM? 60--63 (1991); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE 
HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL 
FINANCE, AND LAND USE POLICIES ix (2001); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property & 
Federalism, 115 YALE L.J. 72, 103 (2005); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Political Economy 
of Federalism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 73, 83--85 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997).  The theory 
originates with CHARLES M. TIEBOUT, A PURE THEORY OF LOCAL EXPENDITURES, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416 
(1956), and there is a voluminous literature criticizing, defending, and applying it.  Among other criticisms, 
later commentators complain that the model assumes, probably counter-factually, that there are enough 
different “bundles” of government services that an individual’s choice to live or invest in any one 
jurisdiction reveals his or her preference about only a single policy choice in the bundle.  E.g., Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Tiebout Models and the Competitive Ideal: An Essay on the Political Economy of Local 
Government, in 1 PERSPECTIVES ON LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 23, 28 (ed. 1983).  
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or borrowing best practices from elsewhere.69 By attracting capital and retaining 
productive tax-payers, the politicians are able to deliver more services, thereby making 
voters happy and ensuring re-election or election to higher office.70 Even in a system in 
which taxpayer mobility is fairly limited, there can still be competitive pressures.  For 
example, high-earning taxpayers could merely threaten to exit in order extract rents, 
leaving local politicians in the position of having either to pay, and reduce the quality of 
services delivered to everyone else, or refuse to pay, and face the chance of a strong 
negative signal (exit by the most successful) to their constituents.71 In order to avoid that 
position, the politician must make certain that her jurisdiction is so obviously better than 
the alternatives that threats to leave are not credible.  Again, then, in theory state diversity 
can lead to efficiency gains for the whole system.72 
Of course, there is such a thing as too much of a good thing.  We expect diversity 
and experimentation to converge on more uniform best practices, as states copy the 
 
Another critique objects that individuals, and some capital, are not mobile enough to produce competitive 
pressures, an argument I discuss briefly in the main text.  Shaviro, supra note 40, at 907, 964.  There also 
are a number of potential vices associated with competition, which it is not my intention to dwell on 
extensively here.  But, among other claims, competition in a system in which some governments have 
unequal resources may distort the market for good government.  See Richard Briffault, Our Localism, Part 
II---Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 349--352, 415 (1990). 
69 William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: 
Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 208--09 (1997). 
70 PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF Federalism 17--18, 25 (1995).   
71 Timothy Beasley & Anne Case, Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick 
Competition, 85 Am. Econ. Rev. 30--31 (1995); Bratton & McCahery, supra note 69, at 264-65. 
72 There is a spirited debate among economists concerning whether federalism in fact results in more 
efficient delivery of government services, particularly those that redistribute resources.  Economists who 
believe that local services are inefficient argue that the benefits of competition and experimentation are 
outweighed by deadweight losses that result from the costs taxpayers incur in researching competing 
jurisdictions and relocating.  For summaries by some of the primary combatants, see Wallace E. Oates, 
Fiscal Competition and European Union: Contrasting Perspectives, 31 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 133-
-45 (2001); John Douglas Wilson & David E. Wildasin, Tax Competition: Bane or Boon?, J. PUB. ECON.
(2001), available at < http://davidwildasin.us/pub/Wilson-Wildasin.pdf>; George R. Zodrow, Tax 
Competition and Tax Coordination in the European Union, 10 INT’L TAX & PUB. FINANCE 651--71 (2003).  
I take no particular position in that debate here.  However, I do argue later that the possibility that inter-
jurisdictional competition could be beneficial, and the complexity that evidently surrounds any true 
measure of that benefit, are reasons that we need to design a policy-making structure that is capable of 
analyzing the question thoroughly and openly.   
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superior efforts of their competitors.73 For example, states compete to develop the most 
attractive sets of tort and contract law, but over time there will be pressure on states to 
adapt the model that is most effective in drawing in capital and taxpayers.74 And 
familiarity is a virtue: it may be more costly to analyze a new set of rules, or to learn to 
comply with them.  As Daniel Shaviro has explained, each new set of tax rules and 
enforcement procedures creates additional costs for multi-jurisdictional sellers across the 
nation, some of them simply deadweight losses, so that diversity may lower nationwide 
wealth, and increase costs for consumers.75 
So in fact it may be a bit of puzzle why state and local taxation is so disuniform.  
Shaviro, though, offers a compelling account of the political economy of disuniformity.  
The key to his analysis is the observation that voters and purely in-state businesses do not 
fully internalize the benefits of a uniform set of national rules, because the gains of that 
benefit are distributed nationally.76 That is, the benefit of a marginal increase in 
uniformity to the in-state actor is not congruent with the benefit that increase produces for 
the nation as a whole.77 Therefore, when weighing the gains of uniformity against 
disparate policies that benefit only them, local voters won’t act in a way that maximizes 
overall social welfare.   
 
73 See WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 12 (William J. Baismol ed. 1972); Wallace E. Oates, 
Decentralization of the Public Sector: An Overview, in DECENTRALIZATION, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND 
MARKETS 43, 53 (Robert Bennett ed., 1990).   
74 See David A. Rice, Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism, 65 B.U. L. REV. 1, 55--58 
(1985).  Admittedly, “best” practices may turn out to be, from some perspectives, the worst.  “Races,” as I 
suspect the reader knows, can be both to the top and to the bottom.  See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 703 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Richard P. 
Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210, 1216--17 (1992).   
75 Shaviro, supra note 40, at 919--21, 925--26 (1992). 
76 Shaviro, supra note 40, at 957--58; see McClure & Hellerstein, supra note 64, at [11] (arguing that 
essential problem SSUTA is designed to confront is that states do not bear cost to vendors of complying 
with differing tax regimes).   
77 See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172--83 (1920). 
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Moreover, as Shaviro also explains, even if each individual voter fully realized 
the gains of national uniformity, his or her political representatives might not.  Public 
choice theory predicts that government officials respond not only to the number of voters 
who prefer an outcome but also to the intensity of their expressed preference.78 Where 
the gains or harms of a problem are spread widely and thinly, each affected individual is 
unlikely to recognize the problem, inclined to assume that someone else will be 
motivated to solve it, and, even if aware of and motivated by the issue, may find it 
difficult to find others who feel similarly with whom to form a coalition.79 Since the 
costs of disuniform or unpredictable laws are spread widely and thinly, neither uniformity 
nor reasoned consistency are apt to generate intense voter interest.80 Thus, the 
beneficiaries of uniformity often lose out to those who can realize greater gains from the 
disparate set of rules.   
Although Shaviro does not fully flesh out how this analysis plays out in the 
specific context of sales and use taxes, it is not difficult to construct scenarios in which 
differing local rules could disproportionately benefit a local constituency.81 One involves 
preserving “home-field advantage,” as it were.  Let’s consider Jurisdiction A.  Existing 
merchants in A would certainly benefit from the opportunity to sell in neighboring B and 
C without having to study and adapt to new rules.  But the merchants in A want B and C 
to change to the A rules, not the other way around.  They are already expert in the A 
rules, while new competitors will have to adapt; the A merchants may already have 
 
78 George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971), 
reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ANTHOLOGY 399, 402 (Thomas O. Sargentich ed., 1994).   
79 See Olson, supra note 3, at 11--16, 21--22, 31, 35, 46--48. 
80 Shaviro, supra note 40, at 931--32. 
81 Shaviro does mention in passing the possibility of “inducing state tax competition to provide investment 
incentives,” Shaviro, supra note 40, at 958, which could presumably include exemptions from sales tax.   
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designed their existing business processes to maximize profits under A’s rules; and the A 
rules may represent the long-term efforts of A merchants to extract favorable rules from 
A politicians.82 Further, the A rules might be explicitly protectionist, in that they may be 
designed to favor the A merchant manner of doing business over others.  For many A 
businesses, losing all of these benefits is likely much more costly to A merchants than 
gaining access to other markets.  At the same time, A politicians may be perfectly happy 
that disuniformities make it harder to move from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, because that 
helps to lock in A businesses, insulating the politicians from the danger that valuable 
business will flee elsewhere or demand more hold-ups.   
Relatedly, state tax bases might change frequently in order to maximize 
opportunities for tax exporting.  All else being equal, we would expect state actors to try 
to shift the burden of paying for their government services onto others.83 It is not 
surprising that Delaware is funded heavily by corporate registration fees and tolls at the 
Delaware Memorial Bridge, or that Florida employs hotel and sales taxes instead of an 
income tax.84 Assuming the tactics I mentioned in the last paragraph are not perfectly 
 
82 Cf. Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: 
Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 278--79 (1990) (explaining how 
interest groups develop stakes in legal status quo favoring the jurisdiction in which they are expert).   
83 See Ernest Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter and the Position of the Judiciary, 67 YALE 
L.J. 219, 228--33 (1957); Jesse H. Choper & Tung Yin, State Taxation and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause: The Object-Measure Approach, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 227; Donald H. Regan, The Supreme 
Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 
1191 (1986); Shaviro, supra note 40, at 910. 
84 See Federation of Tax Administrators, 2005 State Tax Collection by Source, available at 
<http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/05taxdis.html>; Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the 
Proper Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 572--73 (1994).  For more 
detailed Delaware fiscal data, see State of Delaware, Government Information Center, Ch. 7, available at 
<http://gic.delaware.gov/lwv/body/dgbody-09.shtml>; Delaware Department of Transportation Public 
Relations, Delaware Transportation Facts 60--61 (2004), available at 
<http://www.deldot.gov/static/pubs_forms/trans_facts/factbook_2004.pdf>.  For Florida information, see 
State of Florida, Florida Tax Guide, available at 
<http://www.stateofflorida.com/Portal/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabid=29>. 
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successful in preventing business and labor from migrating and developing,85 state 
legislatures might rationally shift bases in order to maximize the extent to which the state 
can impose a heavier burden on out-of-state actors.86 Alternately, as Shaviro also 
suggests, even the illusion of successful exporting may win political rewards for state 
politicians.87 
On the other hand, in the specific context of sales and use taxes we can in fact 
identify a discrete group that is heavily impacted by disuniformity: large out-of-state 
remote sellers, such as catalog companies and internet retailers, the Land’s Ends and 
Amazons of the world.  The problem these entities face is that, assuming they can find 
something other than votes that might be of value to legislators (cough, cough), they still 
face the immense challenges of monitoring and lobbying in thousands of jurisdictions 
simultaneously.  The conventional solution for groups in that position in the United States 
has been to seek pre-emptive federal legislation, so that battles need be fought only in a 
single arena.88 Here the powerful tradition of (and, arguably, constitutional entitlement 
to)  state tax autonomy may have been an insuperable barrier to that strategy.   
 
85 If businesses can easily relocate, tax exporting is unlikely to work because the out-of-state business will 
simply move to avoid efforts to impose tax on it.   
86 See Daniel N. Shaviro, State and Local Taxation: The Current Judicial Outlook, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 279, 
282, 288--89 (1993).  The Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause tax cases, in theory, are supposed to limit 
state opportunities to discriminate against outsiders.  As a practical matter, though, there are many tax rules 
that are not facially discriminatory, and can pass Commerce Clause scrutiny, but can easily be manipulated 
to favor the home team.  Shaviro, supra, at 288--89.  The classic example in state taxation is “formulary 
apportionment,” the method by which states determine what portion of a multi-state corporation’s revenue 
should be taxed in each jurisdiction.  States are permitted to allocate based purely on the proportion of a 
corporation’s sales in the state, which obviously greatly favors in-state exporters over primarily out-of-state 
importers.  MTC, supra note 20, at [11].  In the sales and use tax context, states can simply define their 
exemptions to leave strong home-town industries lightly taxed.  See Hildreth et al., supra note 40, at [839].  
Other popular strategies include excluding out-of-state manufacturing from a state exemption for purchases 
intended for use in manufacturing, a practice that has survived some judicial scrutiny.   
87 Shaviro, supra note 40, at 956--57. 
88 See Macey, supra note 82, at 271--73.  
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Uniformity in tax rules, therefore, may be something of a tragedy of the 
commons.  In many situations, uniform rules and open borders are utility-maximizing.  
But each individual jurisdiction, for political and self-serving economic reasons, can 
exact greater benefits than other participants by deviating a bit from the uniform system.  
As each jurisdiction pursues that strategy, we end up with mostly deviation and not much 
uniformity.   
III. “Neither Streamlined Nor an Agreement…Discuss” 
 So the SSUTA, as we saw in Part I, sets up an elaborate structure aimed at 
bringing uniformity to sales and use taxes.  In the last part, we saw the forces arrayed 
against the SSUTA’s proponents.  The question now is whether the Agreement, as it 
presently is structured, can weather the assault.  Thus, in this Part I consider how the 
institutions set up by the SSUTA are, based on what we know about the performance of 
public officials, likely to respond to the political-process pressures we saw in Part II.  My 
prediction here is that they, like the state legislators who drafted our many diverse sales 
tax rules, will bend. 
 A.  Restarting the Clock? 
 The central structural challenge for the SSUTA is that it must be enacted, 
enforced, and interpreted separately in each state.  Again, the Agreement functions as a 
model code; each member state agrees to enact legislation conforming its own code to the 
definitions and procedures of the SSUTA.89 The Agreement specifically provides that 
member states and their officers cannot be sued for failure to conform their law or 
behavior to the Agreement.90 Despite an admirable effort on the part of the drafters, the 
 
89 SSUTA §1102; see Hellerstein & Swain, supra note 22, at 3-2. 
90 Id. § 1103(B), (C).   
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SSUTA’s library definitions are not self-interpreting.91 Even if the terms were so clear as 
to need no further gloss, there will be facts and circumstances that we can’t now 
anticipate that will arise, and demand interpretation.92 Taxpayers will attempt to find 
nuances of the terms most favorable to their positions.  Those controversies will be 
resolved like all other tax controversies; they will begin with administrative proceedings 
before state and local tax authorities, and be settled, ultimately, by state courts.93 
As a result, the SSUTA potentially might merely reset the clock on state taxing 
disparities.  That is, although it restores an initial state in which all jurisdictions have the 
same set of taxing rules, over time the rules could again diverge widely.  The same forces 
that pulled our 7,500+ taxing jurisdictions94 apart in the first place may well continue to 
tug on the agencies and courts to whom the model code is entrusted.   
 Thus, a critical question for supporters of the SSUTA’s general goals is whether 
the political-process flaws Professor Shaviro identified as affecting state legislative 
outcomes would also bend the path of state agency and court decisions.  Skeptics have 
claimed, with little analysis, that the flaws will infect administration of the SSUTA, as 
well.95 But different institutions behave differently.  Before making any predictions, we 
have to look closer at the operations of state agencies and state courts.   
 B.  How Will State Agencies Perform? 
 
91 See Hellerstein & Swain, supra note 22, at 4-5; Isaacson, supra note 20, at [10].  For example, the 
Agreement defines one of its most important terms, “tangible personal property,” simply as “personal 
property that can be seen, weighed, measured, felt, touched, or that is any other manner perceptible to the 
senses.”  SSUTA Appendix 3, at 87 (Jan. 13, 2006).     
92 Hellerstein & Swain, supra note 22, at 4-5, 4-18 to 4-20. 
93 See generally CCH STATE TAX LAW EDITORS, U.S. MASTER STATE TAX PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
GUIDE (4th ed. 2005); 72 Am. Jur. 2d State & Local Taxation (1974). 
94 See Hellerstein & Swain, supra note 22, at 1-1 (noting that there now are “more than 7,500 local taxing 
jurisdictions”). 
95 See Isaacson, supra note 20, at [13]. 
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Let us begin by considering the incentives and other factors that are likely to 
shape the behavior of state revenue officials.  By now it is a familiar point that, although 
not directly elected, bureaucrats may still be sensitive to political considerations by way 
of legislative or chief executive influence, not to mention the possibility of direct 
lobbying.96 Legislatures can control the budget for and procedural rules governing the 
bureaucrats, and can use these tools not only to shape deliberative processes but also to 
offer rewards and punishments.97 For example, many theorists posit that officials are 
interested in expanding their own power and influence (whether out of self-
 
96 For a large handful of sources among the hundreds to choose from on these points, see Jerry L. Mashaw, 
GREED, CHAOS, & GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997); Bruce 
Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 690--92, 699--700 (2000); Kathleen 
Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices About Administrative Procedures, 89 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62 (1995); Jonathan Bendor & Terry M. Moe, An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic 
Politics, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 755 (1985); Jonathan Bendor et al., Bureaucratic Expertise Versus 
Legislative Authority: A Model of Deception and Monitoring in Budgeting, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1041 
(1985); Randall L. Calvert et al., A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI.
588 (1989); Daniel P. Carpenter, Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in 
Federal Regulation, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 283 (1996); J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional 
Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443 (2003); David Epstein & Sharyn 
O'Halloran, A Theory of Strategic Oversight: Congress, Lobbyists, and the Bureaucracy, 11 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 227 (1995); Thomas H. Hammond & Jack H. Knott, Who Controls the Bureaucracy? Presidential 
Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-
Institutional Policy-Making, 12 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 119, 120--25 (1996); Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. 
Shepsle, Commentary on “Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies”: 
Administrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L. 
REV. 499 (1989); Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative 
Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as 
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. Econ. & Org. 243 (1987); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure 
and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 
VA. L. REV. 431 (1989) [hereinafter McCubbins et al., Structure and Process]; Terry M. Moe, The New 
Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739 (1984); Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of 
Accountability and Political Review of Agency Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059 (2001); David B. Spence, 
Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law To Steer Administrative Agencies, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 
(1999); Craig Volden, Delegating Power to Bureaucracies: Evidence From the States, 18 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 187 (2002); Barry R. Weingast, The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal Agent 
Perspective (With Applications to the SEC), 44 PUB. CHOICE 147 (1984); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. 
Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade 
Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983).  My account of this vast literature here is necessarily much 
simplified.  Among the many influences that may shape bureaucratic outcomes, I here develop only those I 
see most likely to affect administration of the SSUTA.  My hope is that I have identified the most 
significant factors in that question, but only observations of the SSUTA in action can tell us for certain.  
97 See Lindsay, A Theory of Government Enterprise, 84 J. Pol. Econ. 1061 (1976); McCubbins et al., 
Structure and Process, supra note 96, at 434, 440--44. 
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aggrandizement or a belief in their mission), and that legislatures use this desire to align 
bureaucratic with legislative incentives.98 That would tend to lead us to conclude that 
Shaviro’s predictions about state behavior will also extend to state administration of the 
SSUTA’s terms. 
On the other hand, the literature also suggests that there rarely is a complete 
match between legislative (or even legislative and chief executive) and bureaucratic 
goals.99 Some agency personnel may be difficult to monitor, and political actors’ 
available sanctions may be more costly to the political actor than to the bureaucrat.100 
Thus, for instance, some argue that agency personnel have a stronger institutional interest 
in preserving the long-term financial stability of the state government than their political 
superiors, because they need not balance the need to obtain funds against voter antipathy 
to taxes, and their time horizons in their jobs are much longer.101 
Even so, any bureaucratic preference for healthy revenues over the long term is 
still likely, as with the factors Shaviro identified, to favor local taxpayers over out-of-
state interests.  True, free-trade theory predicts that shifting the locality’s tax burden to 
foreign payers will reduce tax revenues for everyone, by degrading the efficiency of the 
market.102 But that is a very long-term effect,103 and likely to be considerably 
 
98 E.g., GORDON TULLOCK, THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRACY 134--36, 167--70 (1965); Peter H. Aranson et 
al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 38, 47--48 (1982). 
99 See, e.g., David Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and the Powers that Be: The Constitutional Purposes 
of the Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 355, 386--87 (1987); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies 
in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 583--95 (1984). 
100 See I RICHARD C. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, ' 7.9, at 356--57 (4th ed. 2002); Matthew 
Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1121, 1208 (2000). 
101 See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1511, 1554--55 (1992). 
102 LORTIE, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE LAW OF GATT 2 (1975); J. VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION 
ISSUE 41-56 (1950).  I focus here on the effects on the tax base because our working hypothesis is that state 
officers may be motivated largely by a desire to expand available revenue.  Tax exporting, and other 
locational inefficiencies, create other, larger losses of societal welfare generally.  Shaviro, supra note 40, at 
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outweighed in the middle term by the possibility of raising rates on a constituency that 
has little political influence.  However long the agency time horizon, its members are 
likely to discount (both rationally and, to some extent, irrationally) the cost of losses in 
the distant future.104 And in some cases it is likely that immediate rents, plus interest, 
will exceed the cost to the state treasury of any inefficiencies.   
 Other state revenue agency influences also tend to favor in-state actors.  For 
example, administrative scholars generally predict that agencies will often be heavily 
influenced by the entities they regulate.105 Part of that influence arises from the fact that 
the regulated entities have knowledge and experience that the agency needs to do its job 
well; another part is familiarity; and a significant portion is the possibility of payoffs in 
some form to the regulators.106 Local taxpayers can employ all these tools more 
effectively than their rivals.  They will have more knowledge about local conditions, will 
do business more regularly with their in-state revenue agency than the foreign taxpayer, 
and will be more likely to be able to intervene with political supervisors, or offer enticing 
future employment, than the out-of-towners.  
 
898--901.  Although such losses no doubt affect state revenue officers to some degree, the extent to which 
they internalize this harm may reflect only a small fraction of its harm to society.  
103 LORTIE, supra note 102, at 2. 
104 See Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167, 199 (1999); 
Daniel A. Farber, From Here to Eternity: Environmental Law and Future Generations, 2003 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 289, 294--301; Dan Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263. 265--66 (1979); Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and 
Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930, 971--73 (1988); Clayton P. Gillette & 
James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1039--41 (1990); cf. Aranson et al., A
Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 31 (1982) (predicting that elected officials will 
tend to respond more to issues with “immediate impact”). 
105 E.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory & the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1050--
51 (1997); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 335 
(1974). 
106 See David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 
97, 114 (2000); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1669, 1686 (1975). 
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At the same time, there is also a thread in the theoretical literature on agency 
behavior suggesting that bureaucrats respond not purely to incentives but also to their 
own sense of institutional ideology or mission.107 More recent developments in the 
psychology of public officials offers a causal explanation for the power of an individual’s 
sense of mission, or “role-norm.”  Both the individual and society may expect certain 
kinds of behavior from persons who hold that individual’s office, and the individual may 
experience shame, embarrassment, fear of lost identity and social status, or cognitive 
dissonance -- all powerful internal forces -- when she deviates from those expectations.108 
Thus, the bureaucrat’s perception of social expectations, and internalization of them, can 
lead her to resist entreaties to heed other political forces.109 
It isn’t clear how the influence of institutional norms would likely cut for 
administration of codified SSUTA provisions.  Even if there were a norm that state public 
servants should regulate in the “public interest,” it seems very doubtful that there would 
be a clear norm that the public to be served is the nation rather than the state.  There 
seems no apparent reason why the existence of the SSUTA, standing alone, would lead to 
a norm of national welfare-maximization.  It is true that laws, as a source of expectations 
 
107 E.g., STEPHEN KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY 244--45 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1987); RICHARD H. 
LEACH & REDDING S. SUGG, JR., THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 213 (1959); Freeman, 
supra note 8, at 562, 570; Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 767 (2001); 
Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 317 (1977); Mark Tushnet, Non-Judicial Review, 40 HARV. J. ON LEG. 453, 455 (2003). 
108 See JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 131 (1989); BERNARD GUERIN,
SOCIAL FACILITATION 164 (1993); GABRIELE TAYLOR, PRIDE, SHAME, AND GUILT: EMOTIONS OF SELF-
ASSESSMENT 57--68 (1985); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 585-
86 (1998); Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537, 539-
40 (1998); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 354- 58 
(1997); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality 
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1130 (2000); Richard H. McAdams, The 
Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 355-66 (1997); Mark C. Suchman 
& Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition,
21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 903, 915 (1996). 
109 See Suchman & Edelman, supra note 108, at 919. 
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about how we will behave, how it is “right” or “wrong” to behave, and perhaps as an 
heuristic for how we believe other people are behaving, probably can significantly shape 
norms.110 The SSUTA, though, on its face is only a collection of definitions and 
procedural rules.  If it announces a new norm of national tax harmonization, it does so 
only very subtly.  But perhaps Congressional approval, and state ratifications, might 
contain or be accompanied by powerful and public dedications of commitment to national 
unity, which might be of some help.  And yet, as I have argued elsewhere, norms of 
commitment to higher principles may dissolve under the pressure of cynicism about the 
behavior of public officials.111 Here, for instance, as citizens and officials in State A see 
that State B is “cheating,” the expectations for State A officials might quickly diminish.  
Developing a strong nationwide norm among state officials could, as a result, be very 
difficult, because any cracks in the wall might quickly spread. 
 In short, without a strong tool for ensuring nationwide compliance, it seems 
unlikely that we will see national uniformity develop spontaneously from the behavior of 
state-level administrators.   
 C.  The Performance of State Courts 
 The state judiciary may be unlikely to do much better.  As other commentators 
have observed, state courts have their own structural features that can tend to make them 
inclined to favor local interests over national, or at least non-local, goods.112 The vast 
 
110 See Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 
86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1581, 1596--1600 (2000); Jackson, supra note 2, at 2222; Richard H. McAdams, The 
Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 347 (1997). 
111 Brian Galle, The Justice of Administation: Judicial Responses to Executive Claims of Independent 
Authority to Interpret the Constitution, 33 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 157, 176--78 (2005). 
112 Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal 
Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 372--75 (1992); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1124-27 (1977).  For a similar view in the tax context, see, e.g., William J. Quirk & 
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majority of state courts are elected, and many state judges depend either on campaign 
contributions or intensely motivated grassroots support to win elections.113 State judges 
may, like administrators, prefer empire-building; that is, they would rather make their 
own doctrine than have to follow a set of rules set out by someone else.114 They then can 
more clearly take credit for the results, especially if the result favors their constituency.  
And there is basically no federal jurisdiction to entertain challenges to any aspect of a 
state tax system, assuming the state provides its own forum.115 
There are, however, some defenders of state courts, including the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  These defenders often insist that state courts are, or at least must be presumed to 
be, equally as committed as federal courts to the defense of federal rights.116 Although 
they do not generally develop a strong explanation for that assertion, they often claim that 
state judges are at least as “conscientious” or “principled” as federal judges.117 In other 
words, the claim of state and federal judicial equivalency is a claim about the common 
institutional ideology or role-norm of judges.  I agree that the process of internalization of 
rule-of-law norms is largely what we think makes courts act like courts: judges have an 
ideological or deep psychological commitment to behaving in the way we expect judges 
 
C. Rhett Shaver, Does Congress Put Federalism at Risk When It Limits the States’ Power to Tax?, 21 
STATE TAX NOTES 649, 649 (2001).   
113 Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty:  Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 689, 725 (1995).   
114 Cf. Graetz & Warren, supra note 66, at 1234 (noting that european supreme courts have refused to send 
legal questions to European Court of Justice despite treaty obligations to do so); Daryl Levinson, Empire-
Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 960--64 (2005) (analyzing possible 
“empire-building” tendencies of federal judges).   
115 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXTION 1062 (7th ed. 2001) 
(citing Cal. v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 411 (1982)).   
116 E.g., California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 417 & n.32 (1982); Paul M. Bator, The State 
Court and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605 (1981); Paul M. Bator, Finality 
in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 509--11 (1963) 
[hereinafter Bator, Finality]. 
117 E.g., Bator, Finality, supra note 116, at 510--11.   
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to behave.118 The Supreme Court, I have argued, has labored to control inferior courts by 
setting out (largely informally) a code of behavior for judges, an “institutional ideology” 
of principled behavior it expects judges to follow.119 We could see the Court’s frequent 
pronouncements that “[s]tate courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation 
to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law”120 as part of its more general 
project to encourage a norm of obedience to precedent among its lower courts.   
 Even if this project is effective, it does not particularly help to maintain sales and 
use tax uniformity.  Once Quill is displaced by the SSUTA, there will be few federal-law 
constraints on the content of state law.  As a result, even a very strong norm that state 
judges must set federal law above local interests will do little to maintain consistency 
between jurisdictions, unless there is something in the SSUTA itself that requires that.  
To the extent that the judicial institutional norm is not simply “follow federal law,” but 
“set national interests above local interests,” it is unclear how much work such a norm 
can do in resisting local diversification.  Remember, again, that diversity can also be a 
national good.  It will be very unclear, viewed from the perspective of a single local tax 
controversy, whether the additional diversity that would result from a non-uniform 
decision is a useful experiment or a destructive deviation.  Even a very principled 
nationalist court will often be at a loss as to how national interests should cut in any given 
sales tax dispute.  And, again, state courts may be demoralized by failures of others who 
in theory are supposed to comply with the same set of national-interest norms.    
 D.  The Risk of Sanctions as Reform 
 
118 Galle, Justice of Administration, supra note , at 177--78, 202--08.   
119 Id. at 202--09. 
120 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976). 
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The SSUTA does, however, offer a pair of mechanisms apparently aimed at 
containing these problems, although both have their own vulnerable points.  First, under 
Article IX of the Agreement, states or other persons or entities can petition the Governing 
Board to issue a definition, or refine a definition, of any disputed term.121 In addition, the 
Board has the power to find that a member state is not “substantially compliant” with the 
Agreement, and to impose an appropriate sanction.122 
The difficulty for Article IX is that, again, states and their interpreters are not 
bound by the Board’s determinations.  States are not obliged to codify new interpretations 
under Article IX.123 Nor need state courts or administrators agree with the views of the 
Board.  This is not to say that Article IX opinions will be useless, but much may depend 
on the form and quality of Governing Board decision making.  Obviously a well-
reasoned, persuasive, and objective opinion will be more likely to induce state courts to 
follow it, if for no other reason than that the rhetorical burden on a dissenting court to 
articulate an opposing view will be correspondingly high.124 
On a more fundamental level, a highly “principled” Board will likely be far more 
effective than one that is ruled simply by competing political impulses.125 Suppose again 
that state courts, perhaps even state taxing authorities, are similarly principled, at least to 
a fair extent.  There is a good argument that the Board’s judgments will be more 
 
121 SSUTA § 903. 
122 SSUTA §§ 805, 809, 1002.  The SSUTA’s sanction provision recognizes what is probably a basic fact 
of economic life: if states act in their own self-interest, and have opportunities to capture rents by defecting 
from an agreement, they probably will do so unless there is a counter-balancing incentive.  See Hildreth et 
al., supra note 40, at [841]. 
123 See HELLERSTEIN & SWAIN, supra note 22, at 4-5. 
124 See Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 
1627--28 (2005) (reviewing LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)); Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New 
Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 240--41, 250--51 (1983);  
125 By “principled” here I mean the capacity to make decisions based on reasoned elaboration from 
prevailing authority, constrained by lexical and logical bounds of prior elaborations.   
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persuasive to such a body if the judgments are recognizably based on the same sorts of 
considerations that the body itself entertains – are obviously “legal” and not political.  
The difference is the difference between citing, in a brief, the decision of a sister circuit 
as persuasive authority and citing the results of a public opinion poll on the same subject.  
The “principled” court believes, rightly or wrongly, that legal reasoning is what it 
engages in, and will have to engage much more directly arguments presented in the same 
mode.  A principled approach also makes it easier for state courts to resist local political 
pressure to reach an outcome different than the Board’s, because it provides the court 
with the rhetorical claim that it is simply “following the law” rather than enacting the 
political preferences of an out-of-state majority.126 We can see something of the same 
effect in the federal administrative law tendency for courts to find more “persuasive” 
administrative decisions that remain consistent over time.127 That rule helps to protect 
private planning, of course,128 but it also seems to reflect a judgment that a consistent 
position across administrations evinces a more principled stand, rather than a convenient 
political one.  In any event, it remains the case that even a highly principled Board with 
highly principled state courts can at most expect to be highly persuasive, not controlling.   
The Board’s persuasiveness will be further constrained by an ambiguity in its 
fundamental structure.  If we look to how courts (federal courts, at least) have treated 
other institutions’ interpretations of the other institutions’ own judgments, we see two 
main threads.  One thread follows the legislative history paradigm.  Courts typically 
 
126 See LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
237 (2004). 
127 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001); EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 
244, 256-58 (1991). 
128 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 457-58 (1978); Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics 
and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1179, 1184. 
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accord little weight to the views of a subsequent Congress about the meaning of an earlier 
enactment.129 Another thread is agency interpretations of the agency’s own rule, where, 
in contrast, the agency will usually receive overwhelming deference.130 The difference 
is, basically, a difference in judicial attitudes about the appropriate scope of the other 
institution’s authority.  If we want the institution to move slowly, and to have to 
deliberate carefully and reach specific agreement before its rules can take effect, we give 
little heed to opinions issuing from only a portion of the body, especially those 
attempting to modify the meaning of earlier, more formal enactments.131 If we prefer 
flexibility and quick responses, with not as much regard for transparency, we allow easy, 
informal modifications.132 It is not particularly evident from the design of the SSUTA 
which model the States had in mind.  At a minimum, then, we should expect some courts 
to take a “legislative history” approach, and give relatively little weight to Article IX 
opinions.         
 Of course, the Board is not limited to speaking softly; it also can sanction states it 
finds not “substantially compliant” with the Agreement.  Presumably, Article IX rulings 
could be used in concert with the substantial compliance power to assure that, even as the 
world changes, the essence of the underlying SSUTA remains fairly constant.  Much 
therefore turns on the form and efficacy of the Board’s sanctions.  If the main effect of a 
sanction is political, and courts are apolitical, they may be largely indifferent to sanction.  
If our target is political courts or revenue authorities, we have to determine what the 
relevant constituency for those entities is, and what size and sort of sanction will be 
 
129 E.g., Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 628-29 & n.8 (1990). 
130 E.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 914 (2006). 
131 See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2082 (1990). 
132 See Jon Connolly, Alaska Hunters and the D.C. Circuit: A Defense of Flexible Interpretive Rulemaking,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 155, 175--77, 179-180 (2001) 
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sufficient to move them to invoke their influence with the relevant state decision makers.  
Most importantly, the Board must have the capacity to make these determinations, and 
the political will to follow them through.   
 In addition to persuading or incentivizing, the Board also may have the capacity 
to affect the norms of state-level actors.  As we saw, the power to curb the occasional bad 
actor -- and the expectation that that power will be exercised -- may play an important 
role in sustaining developing norms of national interest among state officials and judges.  
Also, prominent sanctions, like criminal penalties, may serve their own norming 
function,133 although perhaps there is also a risk that they might simply increase the 
salience (that is, the visibility) of non-compliance by the sanctioned parties or “crowd 
out” individuals’ desire to comply absent the threat of sanction.134 In any event, there 
also may be a substantial risk that if the Board members are parochial or self-serving in 
their sanction decisions, they will offer a highly salient example of regionalism that could 
undermine efforts to develop a nationalist norm in the States.   
 Thus, whatever we think of the principle or political dependence of state 
interpreters, the long-term prospects for uniformity under the SSUTA look to depend 
largely on how the Governing Board functions.  I turn there in the next part.    
IV. Can the Governing Board Govern? 
So the central challenge for the SSUTA, again, is that it creates not a single sales 
and use tax code but rather fifty parallel, albeit initially very similar, codes.  But, we’ve 
 
133 For developments of this argument, see, e.g., Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1523 (1984); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 
(1997). 
134 For a discussion of the literature on the counter-productive use of sanctions in forming norms, see 
Jonathan M. Barnett, The Rational Underenforcement of Vice Laws, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 423, 455--62 
(2002). 
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concluded, that may not be a serious problem if there is effective centralized coordination 
and oversight.  Unfortunately, as I outline here, the current design for the SSUTA’s 
central authority, the Governing Board, is not promising. 
A.  The Board’s Operations: The Mechanics 
It may be helpful at this point to review the structure of the Governing Board.  
The Board is governed not only by the Agreement itself but also by a set of bylaws as 
well as an evolving list of “Rules and Procedures.”135 The Board is comprised of up to 
four representative from each member state, but each state receives only one vote.136 As 
for the Board members themselves, the member states, it appears, are free to decide for 
themselves how to select the representative, but the expectation (and current reality) is 
that most are state elected officials or commissioners of revenue.137 Compliance Review 
committee representatives “must be executive or legislative branch employees of the 
member state.”138 Board representatives are not compensated, but can receive 
reimbursement for expenses.139 
At present the Board’s decision making mechanisms are still only bare bones.  
Requests for interpretation are forwarded to a “Compliance Review and Interpretations 
Committee” for recommendations to the Board.140 The Committee must solicit 
comments from the states and the general public.141 All final decisions are public, and 
 
135 <http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/bylaws_rules.htm> 
136 SSUTA § 806. 
137 See HELLERSTEIN & SWAIN, supra note 22, at t 9-9 (“[B]oard representatives . . . must come from either 
the legislative or executive branches of the state’s government.”). 
<http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.html> (identifying titles of SSTP Executive Board members). 
138 Bylaws of the Streamlined Sales Tax Governing Board, Inc., Art. 7 § 2 (Oct. 1, 2005), available at < 
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/bylaws_rules.htm>.   
139 Id. Art. 5 § 6. 
140 SSUTA § 902(B).   
141 Id. § 902(C).   
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posted on the Board’s website.142 A three-quarters vote of the Board is required to adopt 
any interpretation.143 For the most part, the Board’s meetings must be open.144 The 
Board has the authority, as yet unexercised, to create an issue resolution procedure, 
including the use of non-binding arbitration.145 The Board must still vote to approve any 
recommendation that is produced by its resolution procedures.146 
The sanctions process is similarly sketchy.  The only sanction specifically 
mentioned is expulsion from the Agreement, although the Board has authority to impose 
“other penalties as determined by the governing board.”147 Again, it takes a three-
quarters vote of all member states to impose any sanction.148 Crucially, a state can be 
sanctioned only where it is not “compliant.”149 States must certify annually that they are 
in compliance, and the Board is supposed to develop procedures for responding to a state 
admission that it is not in compliance.150 A state is in “compliance” when it is 
“substantially compliant” with the Agreement.151 
B. The Flaws 
 This combination of a three-quarters vote requirement and a “substantial 
compliance” standard for imposing penalties rather obviously portends a fairly sluggish 
enforcement operation.  By itself, though, that is not necessarily a fatal flaw.  As we saw 
earlier, there is a fair argument that courts, perhaps even revenue agencies, in the 
 
142 Id. § 902(G).   
143 SSUTA § 809; Bylaws Art. 4 § 6.   
144 Streamlined Sales Tax Governing Board, Inc. Rules and Procedures (Amended Jan. 13, 2006), § 
807.1(B)(1), available at <http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/bylaws_rules.htm>.   
145 SSUTA § 1001.   
146 Id. § 1003. 
147 Id. § 809.   
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. §§ 803; 809. 
151 Id. § 805. 
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individual states could on their own pursue a fair degree of uniformity, if there were 
strong, principled leadership from the Governing Board.  It might not matter that the 
Board moves slowly and seldom, if it moves wisely.  But I am skeptical that in its current 
design it is likely to do that, either.  I see four broad sets of problems. 
 First, political process failures at the state level may readily be transmitted to the 
Board by way of individual states’ influence over their Board representatives.  Board 
members serve at the pleasure of the appointing state.  Administrative law scholars argue 
convincingly that, in the absence of some external constraint on the appointer, at-will 
appointees will closely reflect the political preferences of their appointer.152 Obviously, 
if the position has any value to the appointees, they have an incentive to remain.  Even if 
that incentive fails to operate, in instances where the appointee deviates too far, she will 
be replaced with someone more tractable, unless the costs of replacing her exceed the 
costs of her intransigence.  There is no obvious reason here why states would be reluctant 
to remove appointees who fail to represent fully the interests of the appointing state 
officials.  Publicity over removal, for instance, seems likely only to increase the 
appointer’s support among constituents who oppose the appointee’s positions.  One 
possible constraint on removal is that an appointee with long tenure may develop ties to 
 
152 E.g., Stephen Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century, 47 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1460--61 (1997); Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What 
Makes an Independent Agency Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 273, 278 (1993); Cynthia Farina, 
Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 504 
& n.226 (1989); Geoffrey P. Miller, Introduction:  The Debate Over Independent Agencies in Light of 
Empirical Evidence, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215, 218-22 (1988) (summarizing results of studies); see also 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 687--92 (1988) (assuming that power to remove implies power to control 
executive officers); Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (“[I]t is quite evident 
that one who holds his office only during the pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to maintain an 
attitude of independence against the latter’s will.”).  The Board is also dependent on states for funding 
and/or staffing, so that even rather independent-minded Board members may be somewhat constrained by 
their need for continuing logistical support in carrying out their perceived mission.  Cf. WELDON V. 
BARTON, INTERSTATE COMPACTS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 169 (1965) (arguing that commissions 
without independent revenue-raising authority are obliged, as a result of their financial dependency on 
states, to be “responsive to the states rather than to any regional constituency”).   
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other Board members, or other institution-specific expertise, that would make replacing 
her somewhat costly.153 But that would represent a long-term cost, and a fairly difficult 
one to measure.  The appointee’s specific adverse vote (or proposed vote), however, on 
an issue known to the appointer’s constituency, would represent a clear and immediate 
political cost to the appointer.154 Thus, the appointee’s replacement cost is unlikely to 
prevent her removal over any publicized policy issue, and she will probably be aware of 
that calculus.155 
The possibility of logrolling likely will make this state influence a significant 
factor in Board outcomes.  Obviously, a single state cannot by itself vote down a sanction 
aimed at its deviant tax scheme -- indeed, states must abstain from sanction votes against 
themselves.156 The state can, however, logroll; it can trade its vote on matters in 
exchange for votes against sanction.  In a body of diverse interests, especially one with a 
high vote threshold, logrolling is inevitable.157 That is not to say logrolling is bad; often, 
it is utility maximizing, in that it permits voters for whom a particular outcome is utility-
positive to attract votes from those for whom it is either a matter of indifference or a 
smaller utility-negative.158 The peril to the public may come if there are significant 
agency costs or other market breakdowns, as where representatives are indifferent to an 
 
153 See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a New 
President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 641--46 (2003) (noting benefits both to public welfare and 
political superiors to long-tenured agency personnel, even across administrations).   
154 On the significance of long-term versus short-term costs, see supra note 104. 
155 The appointee’s awareness, of course, is significant because a significant part of the removal power is its 
“chilling effect on insubordinate employees.”  Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 152, at 1461. 
156 SSUTA ' 809. 
157 See Jerry L. Mashaw: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J. L. Econ. & Org. 81 
(1985), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ANTHOLOGY 20, 24 (Thomas O. Sargentich ed., 1994). 
158 J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY chs. 10--13 (1962); Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: 
A Public Choice Perspective, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 707, 727--28 (1991); cf. Hildreth et al., supra note 40, 
at [840] (noting that logrolling could permit state cooperation on tax policy in some cases in which many 
states are indifferent or would actually suffer some harms from the policy). 
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outcome because they fail fully to internalize the costs of the outcome to their 
constituents.159 In that case, the indifferent voter trades off her vote for too little, so that 
the end result is a net-negative utility outcome for the public.160 
As a result, the Board probably will perpetuate the problem that state tax decision-
makers do not internalize the costs of disuniformity.  Board members represent the 
political constituency of their appointers.  As we have seen, these voters, in turn, do not 
fully internalize the benefits of a uniform set of national rules – again, because the gains 
of that benefit are distributed nationally.161 Thus, it is probable the Board will often be 
willing to trade a more-uniform rule for one granting or permitting deviations that result 
in disproportionate benefits for one group of Board voters.162 
Moreover, to the extent that there are parties who do suffer the full pains of 
disuniformity, the Board also seems not to alter Shaviro’s prediction that there will be no 
stable coalition in favor of reform.  As we saw in the pre-SSUTA scenario, businesses 
who sell taxable products in multiple jurisdictions might plausibly form a potent lobbying 
bloc, although their influence there was limited by their need to monitor and lobby 
thousands of taxing jurisdictions.  Under the SSUTA, their situation is somewhat 
improved; while they still must monitor developments in every taxing jurisdiction, they 
probably need only lobby the fifty states that appoint Board members.  Further, the 
SSUTA gives the business community a quasi-formal role in decision making, through 
 
159 See David P. Barron, Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs, and Procedural Control, 35 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 57, 58, 60--63 (1991); William H. Riker & Steven J. Brams, The Paradox of Vote Trading, 67 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1235, 1240 (1973).   
160 In addition, representatives may exchange votes for mutually inefficient legislation that offers some 
political or other reward to the representative, so that the logrolling degrades public welfare.  Aranson et 
al., supra note 104, at 44--45. 
161 See supra text accompanying notes 76--77.   
162 Cf. Isaacson, supra note 20, at [2] (claiming that even during development of SSUTA states have 
continued to hold onto “many diverse and unique features of their individual state tax systems”). 
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the medium of a “Business Advisory Council,” whose precise operation is at present 
unclear.163 On the other hand, the business community will repeatedly be fractured 
between businesses whose interests are solely in uniformity, and those who have the 
opportunity to benefit from a disuniformity, as from one favoring local businesses.164 
These disuniformity rents may often be highly salient for the business.165 If so, the pro-
uniformity coalition will likely be unstable.  While these factors are somewhat 
unpredictable, on balance it seems that the influence of business as a force for uniformity 
will be at best uneven. 
In addition, it is unclear that even businesses who would benefit from uniformity 
and principle will in fact prefer them to the opportunity to extract disuniformity rents for 
themselves in the future.166 Consider, for example, the recent litigation over the tax 
breaks Ohio offered to Daimler-Chrysler in order to entice it to build an auto 
manufacturing plant in state.167 The vast majority of states’ attorneys general filed an 
amicus brief in the Supreme Court supporting Ohio,168 notwithstanding the fact that, as 
an economic matter, what was probably happening was that the states were being forced 
 
163 SSUTA ' 811. 
164 See Isaacson, supra note 20, at [15--16] (arguing that local “retail giants” are strongest force resisting 
effort by out-of-state sellers to reduce tax-compliance burdens); Swain & Hellerstein, supra note 23, at 612 
(describing successful efforts of local business interests to alter some terms of SSUTA in their states); id. at 
613 (noting that small and large sellers disagree about rules for exempting some businesses from collection 
obligations).   
165 Cf. Shaviro, supra note 40, at 956--57 (describing high visibility and importance to taxpayers of state tax 
rules disproportionately favoring them). 
166 See Hildreth et al., supra note 40, at [850]; Shaviro, supra note 40, at 958.  In addition, some 
jurisdictions lack a significant export presence, diminishing somewhat the influence there of forces in favor 
of uniformity.  
167 Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 386 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2004), rev’d on standing grounds, 126 S. Ct. 
1854 (2006).  
168 Brief of Florida, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, 
Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Northern Mariana Islands, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, 
and Wisconsin, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854 
(Dec. 5, 2005). 
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into a race to slash taxes the lowest in order to attract businesses.169 These targeted lower 
tax revenues, for the most part, hurt business, because they result in fewer services and/or 
a heavier tax burden on the rest of the tax base.170 Yet the state AG’s pressed on in favor 
of targeted tax breaks – arguably exactly because significant business constituencies 
threatened to go elsewhere if they did not do so.171 Collective action problems aside, 
what may have lined up these businesses in favor of tax breaks was the hope that 
maintaining a system in which they could obtain their own big break would outweigh the 
costs of giving some breaks to others.172 
These political effects might be of little moment if the Board were charged with 
interpreting a highly detailed and fairly rigid set of legal rules, which might leave little 
play for vote-trading or political influence.  Instead – and this is the third problem – the 
most pertinent legal provision before the Board in every sanction case will be the 
remarkably open-textured term “substantially compliant.”173 The uncertainty of the 
meaning of “substantial” is not simply lexical.  There are at least three major theoretical 
 
169 See Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965, 1025--
26 (1998); Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States From Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State 
Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 382--404 (1996); Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. 
Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789, 
793 (1996).  For a skeptical response to these claims, see Clayton P. Gillette, The Law and Economics of 
Federalism: Business Incentives, Interstate Competition, and the Commerce Clause, 82 MINN. L. REV. 447, 
478--92 (1998).  Notably, though, Professor Gillette relies on Commerce Clause theory, and does not really 
dispute the claim that tax-incentive competition tends to reduce overall welfare of the competing states.  Id.
at 480--81.   
170 Enrich, supra note 169, at 378; James R. Rogers, The Effectiveness and Constitutionality of State Tax 
Incentive Policies for Locating Businesses: A Simple Game Theoretic Analysis, 53 TAX LAW. 431, 431 
(2000). 
171 Cf. Kelly Edmiston, Strategic Apportionment of the State Corporate Income Tax, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 239--
62 (2002) (concluding that states face a prisoner’s dilemma in deciding whether to institute tax policy that 
favors local producers, and that the optimal strategy for them will therefore be to adopt such incentives 
even if revenue-negative). 
172 For example, if the cost of a break to Business A, spread among all state taxpayers, is $1,000, it is 
entirely rational for Business B to want to maintain the tax-break system, at least for one more round, if B 
has a better than 1-in-100,000 chance of its own $100 million incentive being next in the queue.   
173 SSUTA ' 805.  See Isaacson, supra note 20, at [9--10] (complaining that “substantially” language 
allows state regimes to “vary . . . in countless ways”).   
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open questions standing behind the concept of substantiality.  The most important is the 
Quill dilemma I’ve already described – whether in fact it is better to have perfect 
uniformity, or whether some diversity actually serves national interests by enabling 
innovation and a spur to competition.174 Quite probably, the Board should have the 
power, and the policy goal, of permitting some differences among states in order to foster 
valuable experimentation.  
Two other substantiality concepts are thorny but not as important to the goals of 
the project.  For one, it is unclear whether an individual state should bear the cost of 
deviations by others.  That is, a single definition, in the context of an entire state code, is 
unlikely by itself to be viewed as rendering a state not substantially in compliance.  But if 
every jurisdiction gets “one free deviation,” then we quickly have a patchwork again.  
Yet if we view each state’s substantiality in the context of whether the system of rules 
already has exceptions, then states will have an incentive to be the first to deviate.  It is 
similarly difficult to say how we should treat state choices in enforcement or auditing.  If 
a state’s code nominally complies, but it is clear that the state will not enforce some 
provisions it disfavors, is the state in compliance?  If we say yes, we come very close to 
dictating how states choose to allocate scarce enforcement funds among competing 
policy priorities.  But if we say no, substantial compliance may be meaningless.   
The point here is not that these problems are insuperable, only that they are highly 
debatable. So there will actually be a fairly principled argument against uniformity in 
many cases.  Thus, even if there were a strong demand among some portions of the 
public for principled interpretation by the Board, it would be fairly easy for the Board to 
 
174 See supra text accompanying notes -- . 
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evade.  The Board could almost always appease individual interest groups, while giving 
at least lip service to demands for principle by others.   
That leads us to the fourth problem.  The danger of using principle as a cover for 
rent-seeking is not serious if we think that the Board will genuinely internalize demands 
or expectations of principled behavior.  As with state-level bureaucrats, or state courts, 
the Board could itself develop an institutional mission that might lead it to resist rent-
seeking.  Right now, however, that looks unlikely.  The Board is composed of political 
appointees removable at will, so that there would be little reason for the public to expect 
them to resist popular pressure.  In contrast to, for example, Commissioners of the 
European Union, who must pledge to represent the interests of the EU over those of their 
home nation,175 the Board members have no obvious institutional mission.  Even if they 
did, the Board members are not full-time employees.  It is doubtful that being a weekend 
Board member will be as important to the members’ sense of identity and self-worth as 
their full-time job, so that the corresponding importance of fulfilling any role-norms will 
be diminished.176 The Board also may not have the budget for full-time staff, and its 
performance in their absence may be so low as to diminish any public expectations for 
better, which would further ratchet down pressures on the Board to do better.177 
175 Derek W. Urwin, From a Europe to a State of Europe?, in THE EUROPEAN UNION HANDBOOK 3, 16--18 
(Philippe Barbour ed., 1996). 
176 See Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1890--93 (2000).   
177 In correspondence, Professor Swain points out that Board members are likely to be able to draw on staff 
resources at their home-state taxation and finance agencies.  But that inter-dependence would likely only 
exacerbate the danger that the Board members would empathize more closely with their home state and its 
interests than the nationalist goals of the SSUTA.  Cf. Diller, supra note 100, at 1209--10 & n.450 (noting 
study demonstrating that cooperation between agency and contractors undermined independent thinking of 
contractors); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1553--54 (1994) 
(claiming that collaborating experts tend to follow views of fellow experts over those suggested by 
outsiders). 
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And so we were hoping that principled, or at least frequent, Board sanctions could 
influence state-level actors, upon whom the SSUTA ultimately depends.  But the Board 
alone may not be capable of delivering such sanctions.  Thus, at the risk of invoking, in 
the physicist Richard Feynmann’s memorable phrase, a tower of “turtles all the way 
down,” we also should examine whether there are yet other layers of review that could in 
turn discipline the Board.  Two possibilities leap immediately to mind: Congress and 
federal courts.  I consider these two in turn.  
C.  What About Congress? 
The Governing Board has flaws, but it does not exist in isolation.  In thinking 
about the Board’s performance, we also need to consider the possible influence of other 
interested parties.  For example, Professor Swain, in his thoughtful article describing the 
SSUTA, argues that Congress will have a strong influence on Board behavior.178 He 
claims that fear of further congressional meddling after federal ratification of the SSUTA 
would ensure that the Board protected the purposes of the legislation.179 With respect, I 
am dubious.   
To begin with what if probably a simplified picture, let us start with what is likely 
Congress’ most powerful oversight tool in the administrative arena is the budgeting 
process.180 Agencies and other cooperative ventures set up and funded by Congress 
 
178 John A. Swain, State Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction:  An Economic Nexus Standard for the Twenty-
First Century, 38 GA. L. REV. 343, 381--82 (2003). 
179 Id.; see also Hildreth et al., supra note 40, at [845] (noting arguments by others that federal 
authorization would put pressure on Congress to ensure future viability of compact).   
180 See LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE 100 (4th ed. 
1998); HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 77-83 (2005); Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, 
Pulling the Purse Strings of the Commander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833, 834--36 (1994); Charles Tiefer, 
Congressional Oversight of the Clinton Administration and Congressional Procedure, 50 ADMIN. L. REV.
199, 212--14 (1998).  For a sweeping survey of a wide variety of congressional control techniques, and an 
appraisal of their effectiveness, see Jack Beerman, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
61, 71--143 (2006). 
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know that each year their performance will be weighed by a budgeting committee, and 
that poor performance may result in tighter budgets or increased substantive restrictions 
on their use of the funds.181 Greater even than the power of the purse in this process, I 
would argue, is the power of certainty.  The agency knows that it cannot avoid scrutiny, 
or at least must marshall substantial outside forces (as from lobbying from its private-
sector regulatory partners) to mitigate the scrutiny it will endure.  
Certainty is so important in the oversight context because legislative inertia is 
otherwise so pandemic.182 The world is large and Congress is small.  Again, this is one 
of the key insights that drives public-choice theory: the cost of enacting legislation is very 
high, because it is difficult to capture Congress’ attention for long enough to carry out all 
the various steps that lead to legislation, and to overcome the doubts, opposing interests, 
and presumptions in favor of the status quo.183 Further, given the difficulty of predicting 
future results and discerning their political effects, legislators may be reluctant to tie 
themselves to the continuing success of legislation that is already enacted.184 At the same 
time, the rewards of high-profile claims of ongoing responsibility are less than the 
rewards of moving on to new legislation.185 Voter attention tends to be highest at 
enactment and rather low afterwards.  Thus, the average legislator often concludes that it 
is better by far to take credit only for the ribbon-cutting, and remain free to assign blame 
 
181 See Tiefer, supra note 180, at 212--14. 
182 See Hammond & Knott, supra note 96, at 121 (claiming that Congress tends not to exercise its ongoing 
supervisory power).  For more general accounts of legislative inertia, see GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON 
LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 91--119 (1982); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory 
Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1524--25 (1987).   
183 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The 
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 66 (2000); Martin Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic 
Theory and the Legislative Process, 68 TUL. L. REV. 803, 850--51 (1994). 
184 See Aranson et al., supra note 104, at 32--33; Macey, supra note 82, at 284--85; Morris P. Fiorina, 
Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 Pub. Choice  33, 
55--60 (1982). 
185 See Aranson et al., supra note 104, at 53--54. 
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for later failures to bumbling by someone else.186 On the other hand, elected officials do 
have important incentives to undertake low-profile involvement in the ongoing 
administration of government, as I will return to in a moment. 
For now, though, the point here is that Congress may be unlikely to pay attention 
to the SSUTA after it is ratified, and the Board will almost certainly suspect as much.  
Congress provides no funds, and will have no regularly scheduled oversight of the 
Board’s performance.  The most pertinent example here is PL 86-272, a statute enacted in 
1959 to protect out-of-state sellers from some forms of state taxation.187 Congress also 
provided for a detailed analysis and report on the “problems” 86-272 was to address;188 a 
thoughtful and interesting report followed; and Congress has done nothing since.189 
Nor will there likely be any sustained constituency for congressional oversight.  If 
we think that Congress, like state-level elected officials, responds to the intensity of 
constituent demands, it is hard to see how advocates of uniform state rules will prevail.  
Again, the prediction here is that the most intense and persistent participants in debates 
about state sales tax rules will be local businesses who might benefit from rules that 
disproportionately favor them.  If anything, then, Congress’ involvement would be likely 
to undermine uniformity, as representatives and senators exert their influence with the 
Board in a way that is far from a disapproving (but fairly inattentive) public eye but quite 
 
186 See Aranson et al., supra note 104, at 57--58. 
187 15 U.S.C. '' 381--84 (2002).  Swain and Hellerstein also point to the PL 86-272 experience, among 
others, as evidence of Congress’s general disinterest in state tax matters.  Swain & Hellerstein, supra note 
23, at 614. 
188 See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 455 (1978) (describing history of Pub. L. 
86-272).   
189 See Hildreth et al., supra note 40, at [830].  Hildreth, Murray, and Sjoquist attribute Congress’s inaction 
to a stalemate between competing interest groups, with none of them able to muster enough support to 
convince Congress to devote legislative effort to passing any more detailed solution.  Id.
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well-known and appreciated by the beneficiary.190 That approach is particularly 
attractive to legislators because of their incomplete data about public opinion; it is easy 
for them to get information about how an active interest group feels about their work, but 
rather difficult to obtain information about how the general public will respond.191 As a 
result, the legislator with an opportunity to appease an interest group with an action 
beneath the general public’s notice is likely to seize it.192 
Let us now add yet another layer of complication.  Coalitions who approach 
Congress seeking legislation or other congressional activity can observe, as we just have, 
the possibility of future inattention, or, at a minimum, the need to remain cohesive as a 
lobbying force.  They will discount to themselves the value of legislation that comes with 
these future risks or costs, and therefore be willing to pay a lower price to obtain it.  
Accordingly, Congress can extract higher rents by building in stronger assurances of 
future performance, such as opportunities for third parties themselves to alert Congress or 
police the terms of the deal they have struck,193 or structural limitations on an agency’s 
ability to go in a different direction.194 At present, though, we don’t see any of these 
features in the present design of the SSUTA or its enabling legislation.  At most, 
Congress has signals sent to it by, say, dissenting opinions from Board sanction 
determinations, or statements from the Business Advisory Council.  But Congress, 
without devoting close to its full attention, cannot be certain whether these signals are 
 
190 Cf. Shaviro, supra note 40, at 953 (noting that public choice theory predicts that Congress may be 
reluctant to intervene to prevent single state from using its tax system to impose costs on others).  
191 Aranson et al., supra note 104, at 38--39.   
192 Cf. Macey, supra note 82, at 276, 285--86 (describing how regulators extract rents from interest groups 
in exchange for forbearing from preempting state regulation).   
193 See Arthur Lupia & Matthew McCubbins, Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols 
Reconstructed, 10 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 96, 97--98, 112 (1994). 
194 See Horn & Shepsle, supra note 96, at 499; Macey, supra note 96, at 700; McCubbins et al., Instruments 
of Political Control, supra note 96, at 246. 
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genuine or self-serving.195 As a result, Congress’ most effective tools for supervising 
those who receive its delegations --- regular budget review, strait-jacket agency 
procedures, and third-party oversight -- all seem to be lacking in its relationship with the 
Governing Board. 
These generalizations may not be fair to all congresspersons.  Some legislators 
will have a principled attachment to uniform tax rules, or will have ideological or 
institutional commitments to state political parties or state government that may cause 
them to prize the long-term revenue interests of states over their own short-term political 
rewards.196 (One sponsor of the SSUTA legislation, for example, was formerly a state 
revenue official.)197 This point, too, though, ends up cutting against uniformity.  To the 
extent that federal legislators make efforts to please their state counterparts, or are very 
receptive to their entreaties, that will only dilute Congress’ power as an independent 
check on the state tendency to disuniformity.  So our pool of effective overseers must be 
drawn from those congressmen who are truly committed to state fiscal stability, and not 
simply to being on good terms with state officials.  I submit this will be a very small pool, 
and that that fact will, again, be quickly evident to the Board. 
 
195 See Lupia & McCubbins, supra note 193, at 104--05. 
196 For descriptions of how government officials’ personal and professional values may shape their 
response to interest-group pressure, see supra text accompanying notes 107--109.  For descriptions of how 
loyalty to a political party or other ideological group may trump lobbying, see Michael A. Fitts, The Vices 
of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1567, 1604 (1988); Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Party Discipline and Pork-Barrel 
Politics (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper NO. 11,396, 2005), available at 
<www.nber.org/papers/w11396>; Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards 
of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 279--85 (2000). 
197 See Internet Tax Moratorium and Equity Act, S.512, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001) (identifying Byron 
Dorgan as one of bill’s sponsors); Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, Byron Leslie 
Dorgan, available at < http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=D000432> (noting that 
Sen. Dorgan was the Tax Commissioner of the State of North Dakota from 1969 to 1980).   
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In short, much the same forces that produced disuniformity in the first place, and 
that will likely entrench it in the Governing Board, are also likely to disable significant 
congressional oversight of the Board.  And that will be apparent to the Board itself.    
D.  Judicial Review? 
Professor Swain also suggests that judicial review might improve uniformity 
under the Agreement.198 Although he does not have much opportunity to elaborate on 
that thought in his brief essay, Congress might provide (as it has in several versions of the 
SSUTA bill) for review of Board determinations in federal court.199 That, in turn, might 
either prompt the Board to give greater heed to national interests, or, failing that, provide 
for occasional overruling of egregious Board decisions.  As the reader no doubt can 
guess, I am not optimistic on this front, either, although I do think that judicial review has 
a role to play in any successful redesign of the SSUTA. 
The effect of the threat of judicial review on the deliberations of the entity under 
review is a subject of dispute across legal scholarship.  At the risk of over-simplifying, 
the main dispute seems to be whether reviewed entities (to be less cumbersome, let’s call 
them agencies, with the understanding that sometimes they are something else) care that 
they will be overturned by the court.  Some scholars -- Mark Tushnet is a leader on this 
side -- claim that judicial review simply creates a sort of “overhang,” where the agency 
will deliberately avoid considering the grouds that the court will consider.200 That frees 
the agency more completely to fulfill constituent demands.  When a court then reverses, 
the agency simply turns to the constituents, shrugs, and says, “we did all we could for 
 
198 Swain, supra note , at 382; see also Isaacson, supra note 20, at [17]. 
199 E.g., Streamlined Sales Tax Simplification Act, S.2153 '5(b), 109th Congress, 2d Sess. (2005); 
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Act, S.1736 '5(b), 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003). 
200 MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 57--65 (2001). 
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you.”  Indeed, in this scenario, the agency arguably benefits from reversal, because it can 
extract rents a second time around for its next attempt.  Dan Shaviro is also in this camp, 
at least on the question of state tax uniformity; he is skeptical that the Supreme Court can 
intervene usefully, especially to the extent that its interventions might deter Congress 
from itself acting.201 
Other writers, including this one, argue instead that constituents and ideologically 
committed agency personnel want results, not excuses, and that they have limited 
patience for demands for rents from their government.202 It follows that agencies 
therefore will be forced to balance the most perfect constituent outcome against the 
possibility of reversal.  The agency might then select a second-best solution that is 
mindful both of constituents and the court.  And, crucially, judicial review need not be all 
or nothing; judges have available to them a variety of tools that allow them, in essence, to 
ask political actors to take a second and more careful look at the challenged outcomes, 
often with guidance from the court about which factors deserve more attention or 
respect.203 In this way courts can improve the deliberative quality of political 
decisions.204 
There is another way in which I would argue that judicial review can improve the 
deliberations of the Board.  As I described earlier, a large part of what we thinks affects 
the “principled” character of bureaucratic outcomes is institutional mission and public 
expectations.  Arguably, a bureaucracy subject to judicial review may come to see itself 
 
201 Shaviro, supra note 40, at 975, 988--90. 
202 See Philip P. Frickey, The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory 
Interpretations in the Early Warren Court, 93 CAL. L. REV. 397, 461-62 (2005); Galle, Justice of 
Administration, supra note 111, at 194--95. 
203 For a comprehensive summary of these tools, see Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: 
Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1575, 1587 (2001). 
204 See Galle, Getting Spending, supra note 5, at 205. 
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not simply as a purely political machine but instead part of the instrumentation of justice.  
Judicial review, in other words, may encourage bureaucrats to internalize the rules laid 
down by the court, or at least see themselves as part of the “rule of law,” which may limit 
the play of political pressures to favor localities.   
My concern, therefore, is not with the institution of judicial review, but rather 
with its particular design here.  Direct review of Board decisions in lower federal courts 
implicates all of the structural weaknesses of the federal judiciary.  As the Supreme Court 
itself has already stated repeatedly, federal courts are not well-positioned to determine the 
appropriate balance between state political tax autonomy, with the benefits that diversity 
may offer, and the need for national uniformity.205 That inability is precisely why the 
Quill Court “punted” the problem of jurisdiction to tax back to Congress.206 Courts 
cannot easily measure, and can even less easily track over time, how diverse states have 
become, how burdensome those differences are, whether differences are producing 
fruitful experiments or races to the bottom, and so on.207 Yet the determination whether a 
state is in “substantial compliance,” as we have seen, requires just these judgments.  
Furthermore, guesswork by different federal courts, in different districts or circuits, may 
result in the same patchwork the Agreement hopes to prevent.208 
These problems are exacerbated by the fact that any act authorizing judicial 
review of board decisions would likely have to authorize review at the behest of affected 
 
205 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 278--
80 (1978); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assumptions of Federalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1763, 1789 
(2006); Choper & Yin, supra note 83, at 211--12. 
206 See McClure & Hellerstein, supra note 64, at [6]. 
207 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 211 & n.10 (1974); Charles 
F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 1015, 1058--59 (2004); Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 
394--96 (1978). 
208 See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year:  Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s 
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1105--10, 1114 (1987). 
1647433.4  53
private individuals.  Again, our hypothesis is that state officials themselves are unlikely 
vigorously to challenge discriminatory provisions by other states, largely in order to 
facilitate logrolling.  That logic would seem to extend to state court challenges to Board 
decisions.  Thus, in order to police disuniformity, we would have to permit the private 
interests disadvantaged by a particular provision, or by disuniformity generally, to bring 
their own challenges in court.  The difficulty there, as I have described elsewhere, is that 
private enforcement efforts often further complicate courts’ policy-making efforts.209 For 
example, the threat of a private suit will tend to make it harder for any central authority -- 
here, the Board -- to strike a negotiated solution with the alleged offender.210 They may 
deprive the court of the experience of the agency that ordinarily brings enforcement 
actions.211 They may be less open to the competing public voices that would otherwise 
be reflected in a government decision to proceed.212 And there may be lots of them.      
Finally, there is an argument that, in providing a basis for judicial review, any 
authorizing act would violate the non-delegation doctrine.213 The argument would posit 
that federal ratification of the SSUTA would in effect delegate authority to shape the 
future content of federal law to an entity remote from federal political controls.214 The 
non-delegation doctrine, although now largely a dead letter, is thought to prohibit 
Congress from assigning its law-making power to any other entity.  Although delegations 
 
209 Galle, 1983, supra note 8, at 216--25.   
210 Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders:  Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible 
Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 420 (2000). 
211 Galle, 1983, supra note 8, at 217. 
212 See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 156--61 
(1983); Fuller, supra note 207, at 394-404. 
213 For a good summary of the non-delegation doctrine, see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of 
Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2131-32 (2002). 
214 Absent federal ratification, which renders the SSUTA federal law, see Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 
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to federal agencies and to states are now relatively unrestrained, delegations to private 
actors may be more problematic.215 The Court, it appears, is anxious about its own 
ability either to fill in broad swaths of policy content left open by Congress, or uncertain 
of its ability to gauge the openness and democratic character of delegations to private 
actors.216 The Board’s processes plausibly would implicate both of those problems.  
Future interpretations of the SSUTA under the present plan are to be crafted, not by 
Congress, and not directly by states, but by a private entity, the Board, which is 
incorporated under the laws of Indiana.217 It is unclear that the democratic-
representativeness and transparency rationales that permit delegation to purely state 
 
215 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (upholding broad delegation of 
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Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311--12 (1935) (suggesting that some delegations to private parties would  
be unconstitutional); FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.2d 868, 873--77 (Tex. 2000) 
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ease with which Congress could reclaim or amend its delegation.  Vikram Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct 
Election: A Structural Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1347, 1360--84 
(1996).  Under this view, delegations to private actors should be unproblematic.   
217 Bylaws, supra note , at Art. II § 1.  This possibility for future amendments is a key difference, I believe, 
between the SSUTA and many other compacts.  When Congress ratifies a compact, it has before it all of 
the provisions that will become law, so that there is no reasonable argument that Congress did not itself 
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entities would reach the Board.  The question, then, is whether the Board is more like a 
private entity or a state under these criteria.  I think this would be a hard question.218 
These concerns about judicial review all have a common thread, and I believe a 
common solution.  Each reflects the courts’ inability expertly to function as 
representatives of national interests.  The courts’ connection to popular preferences is 
attenuated, and is updated only intermittently by their encounters with individual 
litigants.  Similarly, the demands of balancing different federalism interests stretches the 
courts’ technical expertise and fact-finding ability beyond their current institutional 
limits.  And there are many courts, with the prospect of a unifying Supreme Court 
opinion an unlikely and infrequent one.  These are the exact considerations that usually 
lead federal courts to rely on, and defer to, the judgments of federal agencies.219 In the 
next Part, I suggest how we can get one involved in the decision making process. 
V.  A Possible Solution 
In sum, there is a decent probability that the SSUTA as currently designed won’t 
work.  Yes, it will permit states to tax out-of-state sellers.  And many of its labor-saving 
goals, such as computerized and uniform tax reporting and collection, are fine 
accomplishments and will function nicely.  However, the grandest policy goals of the 
Agreement, its ambition to resolve deep tensions between experimentalism and 
nationwide uniformity, may not.  I suspect there are many possible fixes for the problems 
I’ve described.  Here I’d like to detail one of them.  
 
218 Cf. FM Props., 22 S.W.2d at 874--75 (setting out eight factors court considers in determining whether 
delegation to a private entity contravenes purposes of non-delegation doctrine). 
219 E.g., Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002); 1 PIERCE, supra note 100, ' 2.6, at 97--98 
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To review, our challenges are several.  The foremost is that in-state businesses do 
not fully internalize the costs of national uniformity.220 Many unfortunate consequences 
flow from that market failure, including the likelihood that the Governing Board set up 
by the Agreement won’t have much interest in constraining non-compliance.  Judicial 
review might, in theory, either improve Board performance, correct its errors, or both.  
Direct judicial review of Board decisions, however, looks unlikely to produce better 
results, and might even be constitutionally problematic.   
The first goal for my proposal, therefore, is to make in-state businesses take more 
account of the SSUTA’s uniformity goals.  The most direct way to do that is to impose a 
financial penalty for businesses in states that are not compliant.  States already must 
submit an annual assessment of their own compliance.221 I suggest that the federal 
deductibility of corporate state and local-level taxes222 should be contingent on a federal 
finding that the state collecting the taxes in fact is substantially compliant.  The federal 
arbiter could impose intermediate sanctions, such as 95% deductibility for all state 
business taxpayers.  The IRS could serve the arbiter function, or it might be located in an 
agency with built-in expertise in consumer goods, such as the Commerce Department.  
States and other affected parties could appeal an adverse determination to the Federal 
Circuit.  Certification and sanctions would be binding on the IRS and taxpayers, and 
could not be relitigated in a refund suit or in Tax Court.223 
This structure is very similar to many other conditional federal subsidies.  
Consider, for example, Medicaid, which provides compensation to states to defray the 
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costs of care for the indigent in exchange for meeting a long list of federal conditions, 
including approval of the state’s plan for care by the U.S. Department of Health & 
Human Services.224 The most significant difference is that the subsidy here is a tax 
deduction for state taxpayers, rather than a direct grant of cash to the state government.  
Why taxes?  The key advantage here is that using the deduction helps to remove any 
discounting or fiscal illusion that might minimize the impact of subsidies on corporate 
incentives.  That is, federal block-grant dollars can always be diluted, wasted in 
administrative costs, or given over to someone else, so that the rational business manager 
may discount their proportional value.225 Further, the less-than-fully rational manager 
may fail to perceive the full value of a grant, as where the manager may not properly 
calculate the value to her business of federally-subsidized health insurance.226 The 
deduction, in contrast, hits the corporation right at its bottom line -- no doubts, no 
discounts.227 That makes any penalty more efficient, since the feds need not inflict 
additional (sometimes unnoticed) fiscal pain in order to achieve the desired level of 
incentive.228 In addition, by a quirk of doctrine, placing conditions on tax benefits 
escapes a major set of limitations on conditional expenditures, including a cumbersome 
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requirement that all federal obligations be spelled out clearly on the face of the statute.229 
There are presently no comparable limits on conditional tax benefits.   
Replacing the Board with a federal agency in the compliance certification process 
also alleviates many of the concerns we had about the efficacy of judicial review.  The 
agency will give our reviewing court a much more reliable interpretive partner -- a 
partner with a national constituency, predictable and ample staffing, developed expertise, 
little obvious self-interest in any particular outcome, and perhaps an institutional mission 
in its staff to regulate commerce in the national interest.  Agency approval, under federal 
APA procedures, will also offer an opportunity for formal public participation in the 
outcome by all of the affected stakeholders in a relatively transparent forum.230 That is 
not to say that the federal agency will be immune to lobbying by the same constituencies 
that affect the Board.  Far from it; that is why we still would want judicial review.  But, 
for the same reasons that we are rather less concerned about delegation to federal 
agencies than to private entities -- the greater assurances of transparency and democratic 
accountability that come with agencies, whose deliberations are themselves subject to 
democracy-reinforcing review -- courts could have much greater assurance that the policy 
conclusions arrived at by the agency are reliable and reflect national norms over local 
preferences.  The court’s ability to rely on its agency partner, in turn, largely mitigates 
any danger that the court would have to draw on its own, limited capacity to determine 
the right policy outcome.231 Further, centralizing review in a single court (and one 
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already with a fair amount of tax experience) allows that court to develop its own 
expertise, and eliminates the circuit-split problem.     
I do not claim that my proposal would eliminate all disuniformity.  That is not its 
goal.  As I mentioned at the outset, I believe the best approach to state taxation is a mix 
of experimentation and certainty.  Under my alternative, the Board is still free to issue 
new interpretations or amend old ones.  The reviewing agency is free to permit some 
experimentation, under the large umbrella of “substantial” compliance.  Thus, even if the 
reviewing agency found that a state’s unique approach was non-compliant, it might 
permit it for a period in order to develop data about whether the alternative approach was 
better policy, and the Board could utilize that data to revise existing standards.  I expect 
that the Board and the agency would coordinate to share views about whether a given 
deviation should be viewed as an encouraged experiment or local rent-seeking.   
It is hard to predict the political viability of my proposal, but I think it not 
significantly less plausible than the existing SSUTA structure.  Like most pre-
commitment strategies, it requires at least a momentary coalition of the public-minded.232 
Whether or not we think states will support my version depends, I suppose, on whether 
we think states genuinely want uniformity or are presently only pretending to want it in 
order to get jurisdiction to tax out-of-state sellers.  Businesses should prefer my plan, 
despite what looks like a potential for draconian penalties -- assuming, again, that they 
genuinely are burdened by disuniformity, and aren’t simply latching onto that argument 
as a basis for resisting sales tax collection duties.  So, if nothing else, debate about this 
proposal should give us more information about where the sides really stand.   
 
232 SEE BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 240, 262, 272--74 (1991); JON ELSTER,
ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS (1979); cf. Swain & Hellerstein, supra note 23, at 613 (noting that success of 
SSUTA project is dependent on “individual sacrifice to the greater good”).   
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VI.  Conclusion 
There are several generalizable points that emerge from this case study.  The 
foremost, I think, is that federalism is not self-implementing.  Our first efforts at 
implementing state sales tax autonomy were something of a disaster.  Unmediated 
competition and experiment among jurisdictions, reigned in only by severe and 
economically distorting penalties imposed by the Supreme Court when the experiment 
threatened the existence of an open market, produced a fairly unhappy outcome.  
Everyone, from Court to states to businesses, recognizes that the present regime is fairly 
untenable.233 
Unfortunately, we have been slow to broaden the scope of this recognition.  
Despite its evident failures, we are still using, in essence, the state sales tax model as the 
purported solution to a variety of other national policy problems.  That is, we permit 
largely unmediated competition among state and local actors, with the only regular 
intervention a relatively rigid judge-made rule that freezes the competition in place or 
draws a bright line beyond which it cannot cross.  Consider law enforcement.  Localities 
may compete to see which can be toughest on crime, pressing the envelope of crime-
fighting tactics until stung back, occasionally, by the extreme sanction of suppression of 
evidence or dismissal of the conviction or sentence.234 
This project therefore supports the view, pressed elsewhere by this and other 
commentators, that experimentation and competition are best served by a refereed 
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federalism.235 As I have shown, to make the most of our federal system, we need to 
develop the institutional expertise to evaluate parallel programs, and the institutional will 
to implement best practices that may run contrary to purely local interests.  Achieving 
those goals will often mean that the market, or the market as intermittently regulated by a 
fairly limited federal court system, must be supplemented by other actors working in 
coordination with courts, with one another, and with private stakeholders.  
Thus, designing a system that can accomplish both tasks at once may require 
some ingenuity.  One particular design lesson the SSUTA experience shows us is the 
importance of identifying the incentives of key stakeholders.  Once we saw that it was 
primarily local businesses who were driving state tax disuniformity, our design task 
became relatively simple: find a way to align the incentives of those businesses with our 
more general object of balancing local experiments with easy nationwide tax compliance.  
These insights could lead to an immediate payoff in a related corner of the law of 
state and local taxation.  As I discussed briefly earlier, the States face destructive 
competition for mobile capital,236 and recently a set of plaintiffs trying to challenge 
Ohio’s decision to give up more than $100 million in tax incentives reached the Supreme 
Court only to be thrown out on standing grounds.237 Commentators have urged the 
Court, again, to follow the sales-tax model in regulating what has become a dysfunctional 
market: they argue that the Court should hold that all such incentives are unconstitutional 
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under the Commerce Clause.238 Congress, in turn, was preparing to do the opposite, 
contemplating a bill, in the event the Supreme Court were to have decided in favor of the 
Cuno plaintiffs, that would have given broad authorization to the States to give whatever 
investment incentives they pleased to lure businesses.239 
I believe my study here shows that both these models are seriously flawed, in that 
they are vulnerable either to excessive influence from self-serving interests, or too 
inexpert and inflexible to respond nimbly to those interests.  As I suggested for the 
SSUTA, one way to counter-act both difficulties at once would be to contemplate instead 
an institution in which stakeholder input is channeled and shaped by more detached 
deliberation, and the deliberation is informed by expert regulators, so that we capture the 
healthy impulse of state competition while constraining the prisoner’s-dilemma dynamic 
that sometimes results.   
Finally, our effort to determine how best to target stakeholder incentives lead us 
to one other significant lesson.  Our model for coordinated interstate agreements has 
usually relied on conditional federal spending.  Whether it was health care for the 
indigent, education of children with disabilities, or speed limits, we have used the offer of 
federal dollars as a carrot to entice state compliance (where outright federal mandates 
 
238 See Enrich, supra note 169, at 448--66; Philip P. Frickey, The Congressional Process and the 
Constitutionality of Federal Legislation to End the War Among the States, THE REGION, June 1996, at 58; 
Matthew Schaefer, State Investment Attraction Subsidy Wars Resulting From A Prisoner's Dilemma: The 
Inadequacy of State Constitutional Solutions and the Appropriateness of A Federal Legislative Response,
28 N.M. L. REV. 303, 322--27 (1998) (agreeing with Enrich, but doubting that litigation will succeed 
because of difficulty in finding plaintiffs with standing).   
239 See Economic Development Act of 2005, S. 1066 ' 2, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (2005) (“Congress hereby 
exercises its power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution to regulate 
commerce among the several States by authorizing any State to provide to any person for economic 
development purposes tax incentives that otherwise would be the cause or source of discrimination against 
interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, except as otherwise 
provided by law.”); Economic Development Act of 2005, H.R. 2471, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (2005) (same). 
1647433.4  63
were thought undesirable or beyond Congress’ power).240 But tax subsidies can be 
carrots, too.241 The SSUTA example, I would argue, shows us an instance where 
conditioning tax benefits in the same way we have in the past conditioned direct spending 
can be a more efficient way of affecting the behavior of local or private actors.  
Federalism, for all its benefits, gives us plenty of headaches in coordinating our many 
competing sub-national interests.  We should be open to any solution, even one as strange 
as conditional business deductions.   
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